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 Chapter I  
Introduction and Background 
 
Microenteprises, non-crop enterprises with 10 or fewer employees1, are increasingly 
recognized as major generators of income and employment in the developing world2.  In 
Latin America, the region of focus of this dissertation, microenteprises are estimated to 
account for 20% of GDP and anywhere from 30%-50% of total urban employment3.  Recent 
evidence also suggests that the size of the sector is driven by voluntary entry4.  For example, 
in a 2004 representative survey of urban, microentrepreneurs in Ecuador (SALTO Ecuador 
Project), the majority report incomes to be higher under self-employment than under wage 
labor and report no desire to leave the microenterprise sector.  The same surveys also reveal, 
however, that despite enthusiasm on the part of many microentrepreneurs, a large portion of 
microenterprises exhibit low productivity.  The authors of the report on the Ecuador survey 
remark that:   
“…very few microenterprises demonstrated the kind of improvements or growth 
normally associated with a successful or growing business.  Relatively few 
microentrepreneurs felt that sales were increasing… Very few have added employees.  
And even fewer have made measurable improvement to their businesses.” (Magill 
and Meyer 2005)   
 
                                                 
1 The most common definition of microenterprises is enterprises with 10 or fewer employees (USAID, IADB, 
ADB).  The definition in the text comes from a 1997 ADB report.  Frequently these enterprises are informal and 
employ only the entrepreneur and unremunerated household members.     
2 The Asian Development Bank (1997) estimates microenterprises account for 60% of all enterprises and 50% 
of all employment in developing Asia.  Liedholm and Mead (1999) estimate microenterprises account for 
between 17-27% of total employment in 7 African countries.  In Peru, a 1996 household survey estimates the 
micro-enterprise sector employs 75% of the economically active population and accounts for 40% of GDP 
(Peruvian Ministry of Labor)   
3 IADB 2003, Fajnzylber, Maloney, Rojas 2006, Maloney 2004  




Revelation of the size and stagnation of the microenterprise sector have led many to argue 
that improving the productivity of microenterprises may be a necessary step towards 
reducing urban poverty (Fajnzylber, Maloney, Rojas 2006).  
Recent surveys also reveal the low use of formal credit by poor, microentrepreneurs; 
an important, related phenomenon.  For example, in the Ecuador survey less than 8% of 
microentrepreneurs report using formal credit to start their enterprises and less than 3% 
report using formal credit for on-going operations.  Low credit use is troubling to researchers 
and practitioners because credit constraints are frequently cited as the main barrier to poor 
household’s ability to engage in more productive and lucrative activities.  Several theoretical 
papers have shown that in the presence of entry costs or continual investment requirements 
credit constraints prevent households from engaging in high yield enterprises (Banerjee and 
Newman 1993, Lloyd-Ellis & Bernhardt 2000).  Credit constraints can have economy wide 
implications, both for the inefficient allocation of resources, as highly talented entrepreneurs 
are unable to launch their projects, and for poverty levels, as poor households are barred from 
activities that would increase incomes and wealth.     
In many cases low credit use exists despite policymakers’ and development 
practitioners’ efforts to increase access to formal credit.  The most important of these efforts 
are microfinance institutions (MFIs), which began over 30 years ago with the purpose of 
providing working capital loans to poor entrepreneurs unable to obtain formal credit 
elsewhere.  Since its inception microfinance has become a popular part of poverty reduction 
programs, and thanks to billions of dollars of donor support the industry has spread around 
the world, growing substantially in terms of number of clients and breadth of services.  
Despite impressive expansion, however, there is a little cited phenomenon which is that 
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many microfinance institutions face low penetration rates.  It turns out a significant number 
of potential microfinance borrowers never seek out these loans.  In the case of Peru, the main 
country of focus of this dissertation, it is estimated that only 5% of all microentrepreneurs 
have microfinance credit.  Similar estimates exist for Brazil, Kenya and Tanzania.  Given 
that the majority of poor entrepreneurs do not have access to other types of formal credit, low 
penetration rates weaken MFIs’ mandate to improve the well-being of poor households by 
expanding credit access.     
The standard explanation of low penetration rates is restricted supply of microfinance 
credit, stemming from limited loanable funds on the part of the lender or limited 
entrepreneurial ability on the part of the borrower.  Microentrepreneurs may be turned down 
for loans or never apply because they know they will be rejected.  Although supply factors 
clearly influence non-participation behavior, there are strong indications that restricted 
demand also plays a vital role.  In many cases non-participation actually comes from 
borrowers who qualify for loans but decide they don’t want them.  For example, in the 
Ecuador sample 44% of households with a history of formal credit have not applied for a 
loan in the past 12 months. They cite fear of overindebtness and no need as the main reasons.  
Additionally, a recent survey from Bank Rakyat Indonesia, one of the largest microfinance 
lenders in Asia, finds that about half of all poor households deemed creditworthy (identified 
as such by the bank) do not seek credit (Johnston and Morduch 2007).  Similarly, they cite 
aversion to debt as the main reason.  Muted observed demand challenges assumptions that 
lack of credit access is the only barrier to high productivity enterprises or the principal 
obstacle to reducing poverty.  The authors of the Ecuador survey comment: “it is important 
for donors to recognize the limits of finance.  Many of the conditions described by the 
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respondents…suggest that increasing the supply of credit may not benefit most 
microentrepreneurs.” (Meyer and Magill 2005)            
The difficulty is that while credit constraints are a reality for many poor households, 
they are neither the only problem facing these households, nor the only barrier to productive 
and lucrative projects.  Indeed, the major other barrier frequently cited is lack of 
entrepreneurial skill (Jovanovic 1982, Townsend and Paulson 2004, Karlan and Valdivia 
2006).  Due to lack of business acumen some households may be relegated to low yield 
projects that generate insufficient returns to service microfinance loans, in which case only 
highly skilled entrepreneurs can enter high yield projects and “afford” formal loans.  While 
skill clearly plays a role, the skill based argument it is unsatisfactory as the explanation of 
enterprise choice and formal credit use because it ignores risk altogether, a fundamental 
driver of poor households’ behavior.  Only if the level of risk is constant across projects and 
tolerance for risk constant across entrepreneurs can skill represent the only barrier to high 
yield projects and formal credit.  It is highly unlikely, however, that high and low yield 
projects have the same level of risk or that tolerance for risk is constant given different levels 
of wealth and access to credit and insurance.  Risk is so significant a consideration for many 
poor households, in fact, that even after removing the skill barrier many entrepreneurs likely 
would continue to avoid high yield projects and microfinance.  Perhaps, then, ability to 
manage risk forms an additional barrier to high yield projects and formal credit use. 
This dissertation argues the above point, proposing vulnerability, defined as the 
inability to smooth consumption across negative income shocks, as a new, explanation for 
the dual phenomena of low productivity in the urban, microenterprise sector and low formal 
credit use by poor, urban households.  It argues that limited ability to manage risk may lead 
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some poor households to choose low yield, low risk enterprises over higher yield but more 
risky options.  It also may lead them to forgo formal credit, specifically microfinance, if this 
is used to finance high yield/ high risk projects.  The idea that vulnerability to risk drives 
income choice has a long history in development economics, and there is a large body of 
theoretical and empirical literature on this relationship amongst rural households (Lopez, 
Nash and Stanton 1995, Heltberg and Tarp 2001, Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993, 
Eswaran and Kotwal 1990, Fafchamps 2003, Morduch 1990, Walker and Ryan 1990, 
McKloskey 1991, Wright 1978).  The novelty of my work is to extend this rationale to an 
urban setting and derive the implications for credit use.  By examining the interplay of skill, 
vulnerability and credit we can better understand the income choices of poor, urban 
households, how these choices may allow these households to successfully exit poverty and 
the importance of credit in this process.     
The link between vulnerability and the decisions of poor microentrepreneurs is 
examined in three parts.  The first part, encompassed by chapter 2, explores the relationship 
between vulnerability and enterprise choice.  It first develops a theoretical model of 
enterprise choice where risk-averse entrepreneurial households decide how to divide 
resources across a high yield, high risk enterprise and a low yield, safe enterprise.  After 
controlling for entrepreneurial skill, the model shows that the portion of resources dedicated 
to the risky enterprise increases as ability to consumption smooth improves.  The theoretical 
prediction is then tested using data on microentrepreneurs in Lima, Peru.  After outlining 
empirical measures of enterprise choice and vulnerability, I find evidence that more 
vulnerable entrepreneurs have enterprise portfolios with lower expected return and risk than 
their less vulnerable counterparts.  This indicates vulnerability is an important determinant of 
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enterprise choice.  Finally, the chapter begins the investigation of the link between 
vulnerability and microfinance use.  If the channel lies in enterprise choice, we should see a 
difference in the enterprise composition of entrepreneurs with and without microfinance.  
Comparisons of groups in the ACP find this to be the case.  Households with microfinance 
invest more heavily in high yield/high risk enterprises than households without microfinance, 
suggesting vulnerability may be a component of microfinance selection.       
  The second part, contained in chapter 3, investigates the relationship between 
vulnerability and the use of microfinance by poor, microentrepreneurs.  The chapter first 
outlines a theoretical model where the risk level of projects and a household’s ability to 
manage risk help determine whether or not a household can “afford” microfinance.  The 
model predicts that even after controlling for entrepreneurial skill and wealth, more 
vulnerable households will forgo microfinance.  The model also predicts that vulnerability’s 
role in microfinance selection declines in skill and wealth.  The theoretical predictions are 
then tested using data from ACP, a large, profit-oriented microfinance institution in Peru.  
Positive evidence is found that vulnerability is significant in determining microfinance 
participation.  More vulnerable entrepreneurs are 7-35% less likely to select microfinance 
than their less vulnerable counterparts, implying vulnerability might dictate the benefits of 
microfinance and other policies designed to expand credit to the poor.             
The third part, contained in chapter 4, uses a large, representative cross-section on 
urban, micro-entrepreneurs in Ecuador to gain some understanding of the characteristics of 
the general microenterprise sector.  This is done to address questions about the relevance of 
the results using the small, Peruvian sample.  Comparisons of household and enterprise 
characteristics reveal that the Peruvian sample is slightly better off, slightly more 
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entrepreneurial and uses significantly more credit than the average, urban microentrepreneur 
in Ecuador.  To the extent the Ecuadorian sample is somewhat representative of the universe 
of microentrepreneurs, these comparisons suggest the behavior exhibited by the Peruvian 
entrepreneurs is also found in the general population.  This implies that links between 
vulnerability, enterprise choice and credit use found in the Peruvian data are not anomalous 
and may have important implications for the sector as a whole.            
Overall this dissertation contributes to the existing literature in development 
economics on two fronts.  First, it extends the discussion of income choice for poor 
households to an urban setting, applying the framework outlined in a rural context to 
microenterprises.  This is an important extension because microenterprises are the major 
income source for the urban poor.  Furthermore, poor, urban households face different choice 
sets and constraints than their rural counterparts and, aside from work examining the causes 
and consequences of informality and recent work examining returns to capital (McKenzie 
and Woodruff 2006), there is limited research on their income decisions and how these relate 
to risk management strategies.          
Second, it contributes to the discussion of whether or not access to credit is sufficient 
to achieve poverty reduction goals.  Despite new empirical evidence that credit access helps 
some households exit poverty (Burgess and Pande 2005, Khandker 2003), various 
experiments in the provision of credit to the poor, specifically microfinance, have 
demonstrated that credit expansion is not a magic solution.  Many microfinance borrowers do 
not appear to be one or two loans away from crossing the poverty line.  This suggests other 
factors, principally vulnerability, may prevent households from benefiting from financial 




Vulnerability as a Determinant of Enterprise Choice 
I.  Introduction 
Microenteprises, non-crop enterprises with 10 or fewer employees5, are increasingly 
recognized as major generators of income and employment in the developing world6.  In 
Latin America, the region of focus of this dissertation, microenteprises are estimated to 
account for 20% of GDP and anywhere from 30%-50% of total urban employment7.  
Furthermore, recent work suggests the size of the sector is due to demand (enterprises offer 
higher income than other options) rather than supply (lack of other income options, 
principally wage labor) factors8 9.  For example, in a representative survey in Ecuador the 
majority of microentrepreneurs report entering the sector voluntarily and considering 
themselves better off than under previous engagements.  Despite the enthusiasm for self-
employment, however, another observed phenomenon of the sector is low productivity.  The 
majority of microenterprises do not hire employees, do not make new investments, and 
generally do not grow.  This stagnation has led some researchers and practitioners to argue 
                                                 
5 The most common definition of microenterprises is enterprises with 10 or fewer employees (USAID, IADB, 
ADB).  The definition in the text comes from a 1997 ADB report.  Frequently these enterprises are informal and 
employ only the entrepreneur and unremunerated household members.     
6 The Asian Development Bank (1997) estimates microenterprises account for 60% of all enterprises and 50% 
of all employment in developing Asia.  Liedholm and Mead (1999) estimate microenterprises account for 
between 17-27% of total employment in 7 African countries.  In Peru, a 1996 household survey estimates the 
micro-enterprise sector employs 75% of the economically active population and accounts for 40% of GDP 
(Peruvian Ministry of Labor)   
7 IADB 2003, Fajnzylber, Maloney, Rojas 2006, Maloney 2004  
8 Papers arguing the informal, self-employment is involuntary and inferior and papers arguing the opposite, that 
these enterprises are voluntary and first-best are described by Maloney (2004).  There are also papers “in 
between”, arguing that labor intensive, low entry barrier enterprises can serve to absorb surplus labor while 
capital intensive, high entry barrier enterprises likely pull workers from other sources. (Daniels (2003))    
9 The SALTO Ecuador Project, 2004, asks entrepreneurs what type of work they had prior to opening their 
enterprises and reasons for switching.  Very few list inability to find renumerated work as the primary reason.  
In the primary reasons listed are desire for independence (37%) and opportunity to earn more money (36%).    
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that reducing urban poverty may depend on eliminating impediments to microenterprise 
productivity (Fajnzylber, Maloney, Rojas 2006).   
Despite research on determinants of selection into entrepreneurship10 and differences 
in the size and productivity of microenterprises11, no definitive answer has emerged as to the 
impediments to microenterprise productivity.  The most commonly cited barriers are lack of 
enterprise credit and lack of entrepreneurial skill (Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt 2000, Jovanovic 
1982, Townsend and Paulson 2004, Gine and Townsend 2004, Banerjee and Newman 1993, 
Karlan and Valdivia 2006)12, but there is mixed evidence that these factors, either together or 
in isolation, are the only deterrents to increased productivity.  In the case of credit, empirical 
studies find conflicting evidence on the degree to which credit constraints bind and prevent 
entrepreneurs from high yield activities13.  In particular, a recent study specifically focused 
on urban microentrepreneurs (McKenzie and Woodruff 2006) finds no evidence of binding 
constraints and finds that returns to capital are highest for entrepreneurs with the lowest level 
of enterprise assets.  In the case of entrepreneurial skill, while recent work finds that 1-2 
years of business training in conjunction with microfinance credit leads to higher enterprise 
sales (Karlan and Valdivia 2006), many practitioner surveys of credit-with-training programs 
find muted results.  One survey in particular finds that benefits are highly correlated with 
wealth (Shaw 2004), a curious result since wealth does not determine access for participants.  
Most importantly, experiments in the expansion of credit to poor entrepreneurs, principally 
                                                 
10 Paulson, Townsend and Karaivanov 2006, Jovanovic 1982, McKenzie and Woodruff 2006  
11Liedholm and Mead 1999, ADB 1997, Shaw 2004, Cunningham and Maloney 2001  
12 Lack of credit would preclude poor households from high productivity activities if they have high entry costs 
(Banerjee and Newman 1993), or if lack of credit leads to underinvestment, despite access to profitable, high 
return projects (Lloyd-Ellis & Bernhardt 2000).  Lack of skill can serve as a barrier if it is an input into more 
productive enterprises, or as an indirect barrier, if it is linked to credit access. 
13 Banerjee and Duflo (2002) and Gine and Townsend (2004) find positive evidence of binding credit 
constraints for entrepreneurs in India and Thailand, respectively.  McKenzie and Woodruff, however, (2006) 
find no evidence of entry costs amongst microentrepreneurs in Mexico, implying that credit constraints should 
not serve as a barrier to entry.   
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microfinance, have yielded limited empirical corroboration of positive impacts on enterprise 
incomes and assets14.  While lack of appropriate data for impact assessment is partly to 
blame, the absence of compelling results suggests factors beyond credit and skill may also 
play important roles in enterprise choice.       
I propose vulnerability, defined as the inability to smooth consumption across 
negative income shocks, as one such additional factor that drives enterprise choice and 
inhibits microenterprise productivity15.  Given that high yield projects likely carry a higher 
level of risk than low yield projects, and that tolerance for risk likely varies due to different 
levels of wealth and access to credit and insurance, it is possible that households better able 
to manage the higher risk associated with higher yield enterprises choose these projects, 
while those less able to manage higher levels of risk choose lower yielding alternatives.  
Under this scenario vulnerability, in combination with or in lieu of skill and credit barriers, 
drives selection into entrepreneurial projects.  The idea that vulnerability to risk drives 
income choice is not novel, for there is a large body of theoretical and empirical literature on 
the relationship between vulnerability and crop choice amongst rural households (Lopez, 
Nash and Stanton 1995, Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993, Fafchamps 2003, Eswaran and 
Kotwal 1990, Morduch 1990, Walker and Ryan 1990, McKloskey 1991, Wright 1978).  The 
extension of this rationale to an urban setting, however, is unique.  Poor, urban households 
face different choice sets and constraints than their rural counterparts and there is limited 
                                                 
14 See Armendariz and Morduch (2005) for discussion of state owned development banks and the provision of 
subsidized credit, and mixed impact results for microfinance programs.  Also see Shaw (2004) and ADB (1997) 
for brief discussions of the observed positive link between wealth and microfinance outcomes.  Less wealthy 
households are less likely to seek out microfinance loans and are less likely to have positive impacts on income 
post treatment than their wealthier counterparts, a curious result if credit access is the only barrier in place.      
15 Enterprise credit alone is insufficient to render a household not vulnerable, since many types can only be used 
for the working capital needs of the business, rather than for consumption purposes.  While loan use generally is 
not tracked and some degree of fungibility exists, the short maturity lengths and frequent repayments of loans 
granted at the enterprise level these loans are generally mean they are restricted to covering short-term business 
needs.      
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work examining their income decisions and how these relate to risk management strategies.  
As such, this paper forms part of a growing literature not just on microenterprises, but on 
income choice under uncertainty for poor, urban households16.      
I first explore the theoretical link between vulnerability and enterprise choice.  
Following models of credit and insurance (Eswaran and Kotwal 1989) and income smoothing 
(Morduch 1994), I outline a model of income portfolio choice under uncertainty in an urban 
setting.  In the model risk-averse households decide how to divide resources between a high 
yield/high risk enterprise and a low yield/low risk enterprise.  I find that even after 
controlling for entrepreneurial skill, household that are more vulnerable (have less ability to 
smooth consumption) dedicate a lower portion of resources to the high yield/high risk 
enterprise.  More vulnerable households therefore exhibit lower average enterprise income 
and lower variance of income than their less vulnerable counterparts.     
I then empirically test the theoretical prediction using panel data on urban 
microentrepreneurs in Lima, Peru.  After outlining measures for the portion of resources 
dedicated to high yield/high risk enterprises, vulnerability and skill, I find positive evidence 
of a negative relationship between vulnerability and investment in a risky enterprise.  More 
vulnerable entrepreneurs are found to dedicate fewer resources to high yield/high risk 
enterprises, supporting the contention that inability to manage risk creates an additional 
barrier to entry into high return projects.   
Finally, I explore the implications of enterprise choice for the use of microfinance, 
the only type of formal credit available to many microentrepreneurs and one that many 
                                                 
16 Field (2003) discusses how previous research on the impact of property rights reform has focused on 
agricultural households and largely ignored their urban counterparts.  
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potential borrowers actually eschew17.  If the choice of projects determines whether or not an 
entrepreneur has the capacity to service microfinance loans, the determinants of enterprise 
choice, such as vulnerability, play a role in which entrepreneurs select microfinance and 
which do not.  Using the ACP data I find positive evidence that enterprise choice differs 
across households with and without microfinance.  Households with microfinance are found 
to invest more in high yield/high risk enterprise than those without, suggesting a link exists 
between enterprise choice and microfinance status.  
The chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 2 provides a theoretical framework for 
income choice under uncertainty, formalizing the inverse relationship between the amount 
invested in a risky enterprise and vulnerability.  Section 3 provides a description of the data, 
including information on the entrepreneurs in the sample and their enterprises.  The section 
also outlines measures for the key variables in the theoretical prediction: the amount invested 
in the risky enterprise and vulnerability.  Section 4 uses these measures to test the predictions 
of relationships between vulnerability and the amount invested in the risky enterprise.  
Section 5 discusses the implications of these findings for selection into microfinance 
programs and tests if enterprise choice differs across households with and without 
microfinance.  Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Model 
This section provides a model of household income portfolio choice under uncertainty in an 
urban framework.  The theory formalizes the intuition that even after controlling for skill, 
vulnerability governs the decision of how many resources poor entrepreneurs devote to a 
risky enterprise.  In adopting a model in which vulnerability to risk determines income 
portfolio choice I employ several elements of other models of income choice under 
                                                 
17See next chapter for more details on the low penetration rates faced by many microfinance institutions.  
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uncertainty, such as Morduch’s 1994 model of income smoothing and Eswaran and Kotwal’s 
1989 model of credit as insurance.  The agent of focus is modified to an urban 
microentrepreneur and the central decision is modified to the choice of an entrepreneurial 
portfolio.  By ignoring all other income sources, such as wage labor, the construction of an 
optimal entrepreneurial portfolio translates into the construction of an optimal income 
portfolio, which is different from similar models in an agricultural setting.   
Consider a two period model in which risk averse households decide how to allocate 
resources across different enterprises at the beginning of the first period.  Households begin 
period 1 with an exogenous skill endowment (T) and an exogenous endowment of labor (L).  
For simplicity I assume labor is the only input of microenterprises, making it the only 
resource households must allocate.  The skill endowment varies and can take one of two 
values, or , where =high skill and =low skill.  The labor endowment is the same 
for all households.  Both endowments stay constant in the second period.           
HT LT HT LT
After receiving initial endowments entrepreneurial households choose how to allocate 
labor across two income sources: a safe enterprise ( ), that has a low return and zero risk, 
and a risky enterprise (
SE
RE ), that has a high return and positive risk.  The portion of labor 
devoted to the risky enterprise is denoted byθ , where [ ]1,0∈θ , with the remaining portion, 
(1-θ), allocated to the safe enterprise ( ).  SE θ  is the variable of interest in the model and to 
focus on one decision I assume θ  cannot change in the second period; first period allocation 
choices carry over to the second period.  The fixed nature of θ  makes sense if there are costs 
to households changing enterprise portfolios, which may occur if there is an initial 
investment of labor required to learn how to run a particular business.   
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Income from both types of enterprises is realized at the end of period 1 and is a 
simple, linear function of the only input, labor.  In the case of the safe enterprise, income is 
certain across states and independent of skill.  In the case of the risky enterprise income is 
uncertain, depends on the state of nature and on entrepreneurial skill.  For the state of nature, 
realizations occur immediately after households choose θ and can take two possible values, a 
good state (G) or a bad state (B).  The probability of a good state equals p and the probability 
of a bad state equals (1-p).  For entrepreneurial skill, greater skill allows households to 
generate higher profits from the risky enterprise in good and bad states.  This is captured by 
the variables GT and BT, where GTH> GTL and BTH> BTL.  These variables, along with θ and
labor, L, determine first period income from each enterprise as follows: 
 
  == 11 SEYriseIncomeSafeEnterp LSθ )1( −    w/ probability =1   (1)  
     w/ probability = p    (2) == 11 REYepriseIncomRiskyEnter
1
TLGθ
    w/probability =(1-p)  == 11 REYepriseIncomRiskyEnter
1
TLBθ
 where T= TH or TL and      (3) 1111 LHLH BBSGG >>>>
The inequalities in (3) capture the fact that for equal labor allocation high skill households 
generate greater income from the risky enterprise in both states than low skill households.   
 In order for any household in the model to have θ >0 the probability of a good state must 
be sufficiently high to ensure that, for equal labor allocation, expected risky enterprise 
income is greater than safe enterprise income.  If this does not hold, there is no risk premium 
attached to the risky choice and no risk-averse household will devote resources to it.  To 
avoid this I establish that the probability of a good state, p, must lie above the value at which 
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The actual value of p must lie above p , which means  (5) SBppG TT >−+
11 )1(
The strict inequality of (5) ensures that expected income from the risky enterprise surpasses 
certain income from the safe enterprise, allowing for the possibility of positive θ values.    
  
 Total first period income generated from the enterprise portfolio comprised of the safe 
and risky enterprise18 can take one of two values; income in a good state (Y1G) and income in 
a bad state (Y1B).  Combining (1) and (2) these are:    
   with probability=p      (6) 11 )1( TG LGθLSθY +−=
   with probability= (1-p)      11 )1( TB LBθLSθY +−=
  where T=TH or TL 
 In the second period the enterprise portfolio remains the same, since θ is fixed from the 
first period.  Safe enterprise income is certain and assumes the same value as in the first 
period.  Risky enterprise income, however, changes in the second period.  It becomes certain 
and equals expected first period income: .  Given (1) and (2) this means:  )( 12 RERE YEY =
         (7) 112 )1( TTRE LBθpLGθpY −+=
Thus second period income depends on the portion of resources dedicated to the risky 
enterprise in the first period.  This creates an added incentive for households to engage in the 
risky enterprise in the first period, despite increased risk, as it leads to higher second period 
income.  The assumption of certain second period income follows other models of income 
choice under uncertainty (Morduch 1994, Eswaran & Kotwal 1989) and is necessary to 
simplify the analysis and focus on one decision for households.  It also allows for a simple 
introduction of vulnerability, discussed in more detail below.  Intuitively the assumption of 
                                                 
18 In the Peruvian data used in this paper most households operate more than one microenterprise, which is why 
it is instructive to think of income choice in terms of an enterprise portfolio.  Beyond this, one can think of 
enterprises as business models, which can co-exist within the same location.  Entrepreneurs may then combine 
risky and safe products or services within the same enterprise.   
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certain second period income can be explained by better management of enterprises after the 
initial period, which may constitute a trial period for operation19.   
 Combining the safe and risky enterprises, total certain second period income is:   
      (8) LSθLBθpLGθpYEY TT )1()1()(
11
12 −+−+==
 It is now possible to introduce vulnerability, defined as the inability to smooth 
consumption across negative income shocks.  Empirically, vulnerability is determined by 
liquid wealth, access to insurance and access to consumption credit, but for simplicity I 
model it purely as a function of access to consumption credit.  This assumption appears 
strong, but it matches evidence from the ACP data, where households list borrowing as the 
most important mechanism for managing negative shocks20.  Consumption credit, in turn, 
largely depends on informal networks of family and friends.  For example, of households that 
list borrowing money to manage a shock, almost 60% say the funds came from family and 
friends.  Due to the large dependence on informal networks I assume consumption credit 
access is unrelated to skill.  This assumption is plausible since a household’s number of 
family and friends may be delinked from entrepreneurial skill.  The assumption also is 
necessary to separate the impact of skill from the impact of vulnerability on income choice.    
  Access to consumption credit is modeled as an idiosyncratic borrowing constraint 
households face in the first period.  The constraint, denoted by φ (where ]1,0[∈ϕ ), dictates 
the portion of certain second period income ( 2Yϕ ) households can borrow in the first period 
to smooth consumption.  Thus φ is the measure of vulnerability in the model.  Higher values 
denote greater ability to smooth consumption and lower vulnerability, while lower values 
                                                 
19 Eswaran and Kotwal adopt a similar explanation in reference to technological adoption amongst farmers, 
claiming that reduced uncertainty over second period returns from the new technology stems from improved 
knowledge and ability in its utilization.   
20 Households who were hit with a negative shock were asked the main mechanism for managing the shock.  
23.5% list borrowing, while 17.5% list savings use.     
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denote less ability to smooth consumption and greater vulnerability.  The constraint φ is 
revealed to households at the beginning of Period 1, such that households know their 
vulnerability status prior to choosing θ.  Since borrowing and saving in this context is largely 
informal21, interest rates over the one year period are assumed to be zero (r =0).       
We can now outline the household’s problem. After choosing θ the state of nature is 
realized and income from each enterprise is received.  Households then choose consumption 
to maximize utility in each period, which is an increasing and strictly concave function of 
instantaneous consumption.  The consumption path across the two periods depends on the 
state of nature, with a good state leading to a higher consumption path than a bad state.  To 
recognize this instantaneous consumption in both periods is expressed as a function of the 
state realization.   
In the first period households choose θ to maximize expected lifetime utility.  
Households do this after receiving skill and labor endowments and after viewing their 
idiosyncratic borrowing constraint22.  The household’s problem is:   
 max θ     (9) )]()([*)1()]()([* 2121 BBGG cuβcupcuβcupEU +−++=
    s.t.           ][ 1122 GGG cYYc −+≤
                  211 YφYc BB +≤
                 ][ 1122 BBB cYYc −+≤
To abstract from concerns about differing degrees of time preference I assume households 
weigh first and second period consumption equally, and that the coefficient of time 
preference, β, equals one.  Incorporating this and rewriting Y1 and Y2 the problem becomes:  
                                                 
21 For credit, family and friends are listed as the second most important source of credit, behind suppliers, by 
households in the sample.  Interest rates on these loans are typically zero (Dunn and Arbuckle 2001).  For 
saving, most households report saving in the form of cash stashed in the house or through ROSCAS.  Both of 
these savings vehicles pay no interest.      
22 If a good state is realized the borrowing constraint never binds since first period income is higher than second 
period income, so that households have no need to bring a portion of second period income forward through 
borrowing.  Thus a constraint for first period consumption in a good state is not included.  
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π is the shadow price on the first period borrowing constraint and its value varies across 
households depending on their level of vulnerability.  For non vulnerable households the 
borrowing constraint does not bind, so π =0.  These households can perfectly smooth 
consumption in a bad state, such that c1B is at its optimal level.  For vulnerable households 
the borrowing constraint binds, so π >0.  These households cannot smooth consumption in a 
bad state, such that c1B is below its optimum.  
 To assess how vulnerability impacts enterprise choice I compare the optimal allocation 
for non-vulnerable and vulnerable households.  For non-vulnerable households solves:  * 0=πθ
     (12) ])[(')1(])[((' 12
1
2 ZBScupZSGcpu TBTG −−−=+−
For vulnerable households,  solves:  * 0>πθ
   (13)  ][])[(')1(])[(' 112
1
2 ZφBSπZBScupZSGcpu TTBTG −−+−−−=+−
By comparing (12) and (13) it is clear ; the same allocation cannot solve both first 
order conditions.  Comparing (12) and (13) also indicates that the allocation to the risky 
enterprise must be less for vulnerable entrepreneurs than for non vulnerable entrepreneurs 













the left hand side of (13) is too low and we have disequilibrium.  The only factors that can 
change to regain equilibrium are and , which are functions of θ.  Thus for the 
left hand side to rise, must rise, since the other variables are fixed.  Given concave 
utility this means c
)(' 2Gcu )(' 2Bcu
)(' 2Gcu
2G must fall, which can only occur if total lifetime income declines.  The 
only w ay for lifetime utility to decline is if θ declines.  Lower θ also yields higher income in 
a bad state, leading to higher c2B, and lower u’(c2B), further pushing (13) into equilibrium.  
Thus the value of that solves (13) must be lower than the value of that solves 
(12); the optimal allocation to the risky enterprise must be lower for vulnerable households 
than for non-vulnerable households.        
0>= πθθ 0== πθθ
Performing comparative statics on (13) further illustrates how the optimal 
allocation of resources is impacted by vulnerability.  Total differentiation of (13) with 
respect to θ* and φ yields equation (14), which illustrates how allocation to the risky 















=    (14)  
It is possible to sign the right hand side of equation (14).  From strict concavity and the fact 
that L>0 it is easily determined that the denominator is negative.  From (5), which says that 
Z>0, it is determined that the numerator is negative.  The result is the key conclusion of the 




d * >0         (15)        
This is the key prediction of the model; the portion of resources dedicated to the risky project 
increases as the level of vulnerability of the household decreases.  Due to restricted ability to 
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smooth consumption in a bad state, more vulnerable households are less willing to engage in 
the high yield/high risk enterprise and devote more resources to the safe choice. 
2.2 Testable Predictions 
There is a difficulty with empirically testing the prediction that θ decreases in vulnerability, 
which is that θ is unobservable.  As the next section outlines, it is impossible to identify 
“risky” and “safe” enterprises, eliminating the option of directly discerning the allocation of 
resources.  It is possible, however, to derive more testable implications by looking at the 
consequences of θ for certain observables.  The most salient observables are the expected 
income and variance of income of the enterprise portfolio (all of the enterprises managed by 
the household).  The logic of the link stems from basic financial portfolio theory, which 
demonstrates that the expected return and variance of returns of a portfolio increases when 
the weight in a risky security rises relative to the weight in a safe security23.  The explicit 
relationship between θ and the expected income and variance of income of the enterprise 
portfolio, both of which are observable in the data, is described below.     
Total lifetime expected income and actual income of the enterprise portfolio are:    





















   (17) 
The variance is thus:  
2112112 ])[1(])1()1[( TTTTP LGθpLBθppLBθpLGθppσ −−+−−−=    (18) 
First derivatives reveal how the expected income and variance change with θ.            




P      (19) 
                                                 
23 Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2006 
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σd   (20) 
From positive p and θ values it is determined that (20) >0.  In line with standard financial 
portfolio theory the expected income and variance of households’ enterprise portfolios 
increase with θ.  Therefore to perceive how θ varies, we can consider expected income and 



















d p Standard deviation predicted to decrease in vulnerability     
The theory predicts that more vulnerable entrepreneurs have enterprise portfolios with lower 
expected income and lower standard deviation than their less vulnerable counterparts.  I now 
turn to the data for an empirical test of this theoretical prediction.  
3.    Description of the Data 
The data set used in this paper comes from an impact evaluation of a Peruvian microfinance 
institution that was part of USAID’s Assessing the Impact of Microfinance Services Project 
(AIMS)24.  The Peruvian portion of the project was carried out with Accion Comunitaria del 
Peru (ACP, which became MiBanco in 1998), a large, profit-oriented microfinance 
institution with operations in Lima25, Peru’s capital and largest city.  Data on clients of ACP 
and a comparison group, microentrepreneurs in the same neighborhoods and with similar 
observable enterprise and household characteristics but with no microfinance credit, was 
                                                 
24 The goal of the AIMS Project was to gather more quantitative and qualitative information on the impact of 
microfinance services at the household, enterprise and individual level and to promote the institutionalization of 
impact studies among practitioners.  Elizabeth Dunn, Assistant Professor of Agricultural Economics at the 
University of Missouri-Columbia, was the primary researcher. 
25 In 2000 Mibanco opened its first office outside of Lima, in Chincha  
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collected in two periods, August of 1997 and again in July/August of 1999.  The 1997 survey 
includes 701 households.  Due to attrition by 1999 the original respondents are whittled 
down to 520 respondents.  In all of the subsequent analysis in this chapter I focus on the 
balanced panel of 520 households.     
 Although this paper does not address the impact of microfinance, the ACP data set is 
useful because it is one of the few that provides panel information on urban 
microentrepreneurs.  The data also allow for moderate control for access to credit, one of the 
main hypothesized barriers to highly productive enterprises, as 71% of the entrepreneurs in 
the sample have microfinance loans at some point in the two year survey period (not 
necessarily from ACP) and the remaining 29% meet the qualifications for ACP loans26.  In 
addition to microfinance credit, 54% of the sample report having loans from other formal and 
informal sources in 199727.  While the existence of outstanding loans does not imply an 
absence of credit constraints, the fact that only 12% of the balanced sample utilizes no credit 
whatsoever implies that these households have at least some access.  A comprehensive list of 
credit sources and the number of households reporting using them is outlined in table III.1. 
The ACP data are also useful because enterprise choice has important implications for 
microfinance selection.  If the expected returns on the projects have a direct impact on 
                                                 
26 During the survey period ACP offered group and individual loans.  For individual loans the borrower must 
have title to their home or a guarantor with title to their home.  For group loans anywhere between 2-5 
individuals can jointly take out the loan, with the requirement that at least one group member have title to their 
home. For both loan types ACP requires the enterprises on which the loan is taken to have at least 6 months of 
operating history and allows only one loan per household.  ACP also requires borrowers to put up household 
durables, usually appliances, as collateral.  (Dunn and Arbuckle 2001).  Whether or not the group without 
microfinance would be approved for a loan from ACP is unknowable, since they never apply.  Based on 
observable information, however, they would be approved.          
27 Unfortunately 60 households did not respond to this portion of the 1997 questionnaire and the questions for 
non microfinance credit were not repeated in the 1999 round.   Comparisons of the non-respondents to those 
who respond are presented below table 1.   
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borrowers’ ability to repay microfinance loans28, project choice will determine whether or 
not borrowers seek out these loans.  Entrepreneurs who choose low yield/low risk projects 
might generate insufficient surpluses to repay microfinance loans and avoid this type of 
credit.  This scenario could explain one of the less publicized puzzles about microfinance, 
which is that many microfinance institutions (MFIs) face low penetration rates.  Despite 
significant expansion of microfinance services in the past few decades, a significant number 
of potential borrowers never seek out these loans29.  Low penetration threatens MFIs’ 
mandate to expand credit access and improve the well-being of poor households.  If the seeds 
lie in enterprise choice, exploring the determinants of these decisions will help explain why 
so many households don’t avail themselves of a service that would potentially make them 
better off.        
3.1 Measuring Allocation to the Risky Enterprise   
In 1997 there were a total of 786 enterprises (for 520 households) and in 1999 there were 759 
enterprises (for 491 households)30.  Of these, 612 enterprises can be positively identified as 
showing up in both periods.  The difference is comprised of enterprises that close (estimated 
to be at least 94), new enterprises (estimated at 162), and misclassified enterprises that 
actually exist in both periods.  Table II.2 presents enterprise level information, including 
mean values for the number of enterprises, formality status, sales, employees, net assets, and 
category of business.  Graph II.1 shows the breakdown of enterprises across 9 broad 
categories in both years.  The information demonstrates that despite some churn, the 
characteristics of the sector do not change dramatically from 1997 to 1999.        
                                                 
28 ACP charges market determined, unsubsidized interest rates. At the time of the survey they were 50% 
annually.  These rates are on par with other sources of formal finance such as banks, but higher than explicit 
rates for many informal sources, such as loans from family and friends and ROSCAS.  (Dunn and Arbuckle)  
29 CGAP (2000), Berger (2003)  
30 29 households in the balanced panel do not report enterprise level information in 1999 
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  To discern θ, the allocation of resources to high yield/high risk projects, it would be 
optimal to know which enterprises are “risky” and which are “safe” and then assess how 
much of each entrepreneur’s portfolio is comprised of each type.  Unfortunately dividing 
urban entrepreneurial activities into risk/return categories is not straightforward and there is 
limited guidance in either the academic or practitioner literature on appropriate assignment31.  
The first problem is that broad enterprise categories, as defined by four digit codes in the 
ACP data32, do not reveal much about risk and return characteristics.  For example, it is 
likely that some enterprise categories, such as car repair or carpentry, require higher levels of 
entrepreneurial skill than others, such as house cleaning or a corner kiosk.  It is unclear, 
however, if these skill requirements, once established, map into different return and risk 
profiles.  From the current level of understanding it cannot be conclusively stated that 
carpentry shops have greater return and risk than corner kiosks.  Additionally, in the ACP 
data there are insufficient observations in either category to establish one as more risky than 
another33.  A secondary concern is that the division between “safe” and “risky” enterprises 
likely exists within categories as well.  For example, the largest category in the ACP dataset 
is retail trade in a market location34.  The four digit code for this category bundles together 
retailers that sell vegetables, retailers that sell toys, and retailers that sell appliances, among 
other options, and it is plausible that risk/return profiles vary across each subcategory.  
Unfortunately more detailed information on products is not provided, further complicating 
                                                 
31 ADB (1997) and Shaw (2004) do define some enterprise categories as “survival” or “safe” and others as 
“entrepreneurial” or “risky”, but their samples are either rural or semi-rural and the assignments do not translate 
well to the ACP data.   
32 In 1997 there were 786 enterprises in 58 different four digit categories.   
33 To attempt to categorize enterprises I analyzed the mean income and standard deviation of income across 
businesses based on four digit codes.  However, the observations in some categories are so small (in many cases 
there is only one enterprise under a particular code) that it is impossible to discern which categories are more or 
less risky from the data.      
34 197 out of  786 enterprises in 1997, or 25%, are in the category of retail in a market location 
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assignment.  In sum, given the limited sample size, limited level of detail, and limited 
understanding of microenterprise types, it is impossible to divide microenterprises into “safe” 
or “risky” categories and thus directly view the allocation of resources to the risky enterprise.     
It therefore is necessary to obtain indirect, observable measures of θ.  The theoretical 
model established the expected income and variance of income of the enterprise portfolio as 
appropriate proxy variables.  These too are unobservable due to the lack of numerous panel 
periods needed to estimate a probability distribution for different states of the world and 
associated outcomes.  The ACP data only provides two realizations of income, one in 1997 
and in 1999.  Thus the best approximation of expected income is the average value across the 





 The best approximation of the variance of the enterprise portfolio is the standard 
deviation of microenterprise income around the mean.  For the purpose of this analysis the 
standard deviation is preferable to measures of dispersion that control for scale, such as the 
coefficient of variation36.  One concern over using the standard deviation is that distributions 
with greater means may exhibit greater standard deviations simply because the range over 
which the distribution lies is higher.  Thus some portion of standard deviation values may 
reflect differences in the range rather than differences in dispersion.  The problem with 
correcting for this by using the coefficient of variation, however, is that the ratio of the 
standard deviation to the mean may not capture the proposed positive correlation between the 
two variables.  According to the theory higher means are associated with higher standard 
deviations, but the coefficient of variation does not necessarily reflect this.  For example, a 
                                                 
35 1997 income is inflated to 1999 prices 
36 The coefficient of variation= standard deviation/mean.   
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distribution with a high mean and high standard deviation (risky enterprise returns) and a 
distribution with a low mean and low standard deviation (safe enterprise returns) can have 
the same coefficient of variation.  Furthermore, for poor households making income choices, 
the absolute fluctuation in income matters more than the relative fluctuation.  This makes the 
standard deviation a superior measure.  Mean and median values for both θ measures are 
presented in table II.4.      
For robustness I also consider monthly sales from the primary enterprise as an 
additional measure of θ.  The primary enterprise is the one listed as the most important by 
each household, and in most cases it is the longest running and most stable enterprise in the 
income portfolio.  For ACP borrowers it is the enterprise on which the loan is taken.  One 
nice feature of primary enterprises is that they are possible to track across the two periods, 
which is not always true of other enterprises listed by households37.  421 primary enterprises 
survive through both periods.  I use average monthly sales across 1997 and 1999 and the 
standard deviation of monthly sales for these 421 primary enterprises as additional measures 
of θ.  Overall primary enterprise monthly sales provide weaker measures of θ than 
microenterprise income.  This is because households are predicted to make decisions about 
risk/return tradeoffs at the level of the enterprise portfolio rather than at the level individual 
enterprises.  Thus primary enterprises do not provide as complete of a picture of enterprise 
choice.  Nevertheless, considering primary enterprise sales as a secondary θ measure 
enhances the analysis.  Average values are presented in table II.4.             
3.2 Measuring Vulnerability 
                                                 
37 While households were asked about up to three microenterprises in the enterprise questionnaire, and due to 
reporting error, the only ones that can be effectively linked in 1997 and 1999 are the primary enterprises. 
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To measure vulnerability it is necessary to find a proxy for φ, the degree of credit constraints 
a household faces in the theoretical model.  Portions of the consumption literature (Deaton 
1997, Paxson 1992, 1993, Zeldes 1989) note the elusive nature of such a measure given that 
credit constraints are unobservable.  A standard second best approach is to derive “ex-post” 
measures by comparing changes in consumption to unexpected changes in income and 
deeming vulnerable households that register a response.  In a two period panel, however, this 
strategy is fraught with problems and largely unusable38.  I therefore rely on “ex-ante” 
vulnerability measures; variables that gauge a household’s ability to access funds, mostly 
consumption credit, in times of needs39.           
I start with measures of wealth, both financial and non-financial, as these indicate an 
ability to internally manage negative shocks as well as a degree of credit access if wealthier 
households are deemed better borrowers.  The ACP data provide information on four types of 
wealth.  For liquid wealth we know if a household has savings and the net value of household 
durables and vehicles40.  For property wealth we know if a household has title to their home 
and if they have any other property beyond the primary residence41.  Combined, these 
                                                 
38 The first concern is the inability to identify temporary from permanent changes in income in a short panel. 
Failure to disentangle the two can lead to false identification of vulnerable households. The second concern is 
the limited number of states of the world observed in a short panel.  Kamanou and Morduch (2002) point out 
that households facing the same distribution of shocks will have different draws over a short time frame.  Only a 
limited portion of the sample will receive bad draws and thus be tested on their ability to smooth consumption 
across adverse shocks.  The remaining households could be equally or more vulnerable as those hit with 
negative shocks but simply won’t appear so in this snapshot.  These households will thus be falsely labeled as 
not vulnerable, biasing any further analysis. 
39 Analyzing which household fell into poverty over the period, faces the same problems.  This is broadly 
referred to as vulnerability to becoming poor, and movements across the poverty line in both directions have 
been examined by Jalan and Ravallion (2000), Dercon and Krishnan (2000), and Kamanou and Morduch 
(2002).  In this sample, over the two year period 17.4% of households became poor while 8.9% escaped 
poverty.  Poverty lines based on a $2/day measure.    
40 The majority of households held savings as cash at home (over 50%) or with ROSCAS.  Relatively few 
households held savings in the form of demand deposits with banks or cooperatives (less than 12%).   
41 Households were asked if they had homes or residential locations in addition to the principal residence. Due 
to lack of formal savings options many households save in the form of real estate, even in invasion communities 
with informal property rights.  In 1997, 70 households, or 14% of the sample, reported having additional 
properties.  These were used as rental properties, for a business, or to receive family members or guests.  Of 
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measures likely capture some ability of households to smooth consumption via internal or 
external funds.  Considering credit access specifically, while the extent of this is 
unobservable, it is plausible that households with savings, higher liquid wealth and home title 
are deemed better borrowers and therefore have more options.  Of the four wealth measures, 
net durable goods and vehicles might best capture credit access for households in the ACP 
sample.  Perhaps due to difficulties in repossessing other assets, durable goods are typically 
the collateral offered by households for many informal and formal loans.  Microfinance 
institutions are no exception, and ACP requires durable goods to be placed as collateral for 
loans42.     
Finally, it is crucial to consider the extent of informal networks, which are the main 
source of consumption credit for households in the sample.  Family and friends are cited as 
the second most used source of credit and, of households that report borrowing funds to 
manage negative shocks, over 60% say these funds came from family or friends.  Overall 
households list loans from family and friends as the second most important mechanism for 
managing negative shocks.  Liquid assets and property may fail to capture this key 
component of vulnerability if an entrepreneur’s network of friends and family is unrelated to 
wealth, which is quite plausible43.  This means a more direct measure is required.  To capture 
informal networks it would be ideal to have information on the quantity (number of family 
and friends living nearby) and quality (ability of these contacts to help in times of need) of 
social contacts, but this information is not available in the ACP data.  In its absence I rely 
                                                                                                                                                       
these 70 HHs, 23.5% are below the poverty line, indicating that additional property is not limited to the better 
off portion of the sample.       
42 As part of the loan application applicants submit a list of appliances to be used as collateral.  Mibanco credit 
agents verify the status and value of these appliances before approval. (Dunn and Arbuckle 2001)   
43 Correlation between measures of informal networks and wealth is low.  The correlation between marital 
status and net HH assets is 0.09 (1997) and 0.15 (1999), while the correlation with total income is -0.01 (1997) 
and 0.10 (1999).  The correlation between TimeInLima and net HH assets is 0.20 (1997) and 0.12 (1999), while 
the correlation with annual income is 0.12 (1997) and 0.02 (1999).  
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upon two variables related to the extent of informal networks; marital status, as measured by 
a dummy variable that equals one if an entrepreneur has a spouse or partner, and tenure in 
Lima, as measured in years.  In the case of marital status a spouse or partner may provide 
access to a wider network of family and friends44.  In the case of tenure in Lima a longer 
tenure means the household has had greater opportunity to develop informal networks.   
There are some concerns that the informal network measures proxy for household 
characteristics besides vulnerability that impact enterprise choice.  For marital status the 
concern is that the variable simply captures the effect of having another working adult in the 
household.  To control for this I include the total number of household members that 
currently work.  The concerns for tenure in Lima are that it captures entrepreneurial 
experience and/or increased knowledge of better projects rather than reduced vulnerability.  
To control for the first concern I use age and entrepreneurial experience, as measured by the 
longest tenure in operation any of the household’s microenterprises.  To control for better 
knowledge of good projects I use measures of entrepreneurial skill, outlined below. 
Finally, it is important to note that including wealth in the estimation may control for 
differences in risk preferences, which play a role in the determination of project choice.  
Ceteris paribus, more risk averse households achieve lower expected utility under the risky 
enterprise than their less risk averse counterparts.  Knowing risk preferences is impossible, 
but to the extent that risk aversion is a function of wealth, the inclusion of wealth may 
partially control for disparate levels of risk aversion and help distinguish between risk 
preferences and vulnerability as drivers of behavior.   
                                                 
44 A spouse or partner may also provide income that can be used in times of need.  For example, Van Tassel 
(2004) presents a model of microfinance and household bargaining in which a male spouse decides whether or 
not to use his income to repay a portion of his wife’s microfinance loan if a negative shock is realized. 
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In sum, in the empirical estimation marital status and Time in Lima, the net value of 
durable goods and vehicles, savings status, home ownership, and additional property are used 
to measure vulnerability.  Positive values for the binary variables and higher values for the 
continuous variables indicate lower vulnerability.  Table II.2 presents average values.   
3.3 Measuring Skill 
The most viable alternative theory to the one offered by this paper is that entrepreneurial skill 
drives selection into high yield/ high risk projects.  According to this hypothesis, after 
holding credit access constant, entrepreneurs engage less in the high yield/ high risk project 
because they are less skilled.  It is difficult to prove or disprove this claim given that 
entrepreneurial skill is unobservable to the researcher and perhaps even to the entrepreneur 
(Jovanovic 1982)45.  Nonetheless, without controlling for skill and attempting to extract this 
component of the error term, it is difficult to claim the vulnerability variables are 
uncorrelated with the error term and that their coefficients are unbiased.  Given the likely 
correlation between skill and enterprise choice and skill and several vulnerability measures, 
controlling for skill is essential to derive clean statements about vulnerability as a factor in 
entrepreneurial choice.   
The most standard observable proxy measures for skill are education and experience 
(Paulson, Townsend and Karaivanov 2006, Gine and Townsend 2004).  For education I use 
dummy variables for three categories of educational attainment by the entrepreneur in 1997; 
primary school or less46, between primary and secondary school, and anything higher than 
secondary school.  For experience I use the maximum amount of time, in years, any 
                                                 
45 Jovanovic (1982) presents a model in which individual entrepreneurs do not know their actual skill 
endowment and receive noisy signals of their skill endowment based on the cost of operating the enterprise. 
46 This is the left out group 
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enterprise owned by the household has been in operation as of 1997.  Average education and 
experience values are presented in table II.2.       
4. Determinants of Project Choice  
I now use the ACP data to test the theoretical prediction of a negative relationship between 
the amount of resources dedicated to the risky enterprise (θ ) and vulnerability (ϕ ).   
4.1 Microenterprise Income  
Average microenterprise income and the standard deviation of microenterprise income are 
the main measures of θ, and both are estimated as linear functions of household 
characteristics, enterprise characteristics, skill and vulnerability, which are outlined below.  
Average values are presented in table II.2.   
1) Household controls (HC) include: a dummy variable if informant is a woman, the age of 
the key informant, as measured in bins47, the dependency ratio, the total number of 
working adults in the household, and whether or not the entrepreneur was hit with a 
shock in the past two years48.  
2) Enterprise controls (EC) include: the number of enterprises operated by the household, a 
dummy if any enterprise is informal, and the type of enterprises based on nine different 
categories, measured by dummy variables if a household has an enterprise in a certain 
category.  
3) Vulnerability measures include; a dummy variable if the household has title to their 
home, a dummy if the household has property in addition to the main residence, a dummy 
                                                 
47 Entrepreneurs were divided into four age categories: less than 25, between 25 and 40, between 40 and 60, and 
older than 60.  The 25-40 group is the left out category, as the goal is to see if younger and older cohorts behave 
differently than entrepreneurs in the “middle age” category.    
48 A shock is defined as “any unexpected or unforeseen event that that occurred in the previous 2 years and that 
had significant negative economic or financial repercussions for the household.”  (Dunn and Arbuckle) Shocks 
include robbery, death or severe illness, job loss, and reduction or loss of income. 
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if the household has savings, a dummy if the household is occupied by a married or 
cohabitating couple, and tenure in Lima.     
4) Skill measures include: a dummy variable if the entrepreneur has secondary education, a 
dummy variable if the entrepreneur has beyond a secondary education49, and the 
maximum number of years any enterprise of the household has been in operation. 
 The first θ measure, average enterprise income, is estimated as a linear function of the 
variables outlined above:     
ititititii εSkillβerabilityVuβHCβECβαomeerpriseIncAverageEnt +++++= 4321 ln     (1) 
 where t=1997 or 1999.   
Results of OLS estimation of (1) are presented in the first two columns of table II.5.  Column 
(1) contains results using 1997 values of the explanatory variables, while column (2) contains 
results using 1999 values of the explanatory variables, with the exception of age, education 
and experience, which do not change meaningfully over the two year period.  Of the two sets 
of explanatory variables the 1997 values are preferable because they may better control for 
endogeneity stemming from reverse causality (enterprise income may impact vulnerability 
and skill measures).  While the 1997 values do not eliminate all endogeneity problems, they 
are preferable to the 1999 values.  In the estimations 1999 values are presented for 
comparison purposes only.   
Estimation of (1) using the 1997 values finds, in line with the theoretical prediction, a 
negative relationship between the vulnerability variables and average microenterprise 
income.  All of estimated coefficients for the vulnerability measures are positive, meaning 
that households that are less vulnerable, because they have savings, home ownership, other 
                                                 
49 Having a primary education or less is the left out group 
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property, a spouse or partner, more time in Lima and higher wealth, have higher average 
enterprise income.  Of these measures, other property and savings have the highest estimated 
coefficients, with other property and savings associated with a 3,347 soles and 1,947 soles 
increase, respectively, in enterprise income.  Two vulnerability measures, other property and 
net household wealth, are significant at the 5% level.  It is important to note that while I 
attempt to control for skill using observable measures, it is still possible the coefficients on 
the vulnerability measures are upwardly biased due to unobservable factors, principally the 
portion of skill not picked up by education and experience.  However, to the extent the 
observables capture skill and the vulnerability measures capture vulnerability over other 
factors, the results provide positive evidence that lower vulnerability is associated with 
higher average microenterprise income.        
For robustness I re-estimate (1) using only 1999 enterprise income as the dependent 
variable.  This is done to address concerns that 1997 income might have a causal impact on 
or be jointly determined with many of the right hand side variables, principally several of the 
vulnerability measures.  If this is the case removing 1997 income from the left hand side 
might eliminate some of the endogeneity bias.   
iiiiii εSkillβerabilityVuβHCβECβαIncomeEnterprise +++++= ,19974,19973,19972,199711999, ln            (2) 
Results of OLS estimation are presented in columns (3) and (4) of table II.5.  Column (3) 
corresponds to 1997 values of the explanatory variables and column (4) corresponds to 1999 
values.  
The general results do not change significantly when 1999 enterprise income is used 
instead of the average value over 1997 and 1999.  The coefficients on all of the vulnerability 
measures except Time in Lima remain positive, and wealth remains significant at the 1% 
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level.  In most cases the size of the coefficients on the vulnerability measures increases, 
suggesting that simultaneity bias, if anything runs in the opposite direction.  The key 
differences are that the coefficient on Time in Lima becomes negative and other property 
ceases to be significant at the 10% level.  After trying to control for potential reverse 
causality bias by using 1999 income as the dependent variable, there is still a positive 
relationship between all but one of the vulnerability measures and enterprise income, and in 
most cases, the estimated coefficients increase.  Overall these results are weaker, but to the 
extent I’ve controlled for the confounding effects of skill, they still support the hypothesis a 
positive link between vulnerability and enterprise choice.  
 The second proxy measure of θ, the standard deviation of microenterprise income, is 
also estimated as a linear function of the observable characteristics outlined above. 
ititititii εSkillβerabilityVuβHCβECβαmeionEntIncodardDeviatS +++++= 4321 lntan        (3)  
Results of OLS estimation are presented in columns (5) and (6) of table II.5.  Column (5) 
corresponds to estimation using 1997 values of the explanatory variables, while column (6) 
corresponds to estimation using 1999 values.  
 The estimation results are less strong that those for average enterprise income.  The 
predictive power, as evidenced by adjusted R2 values, declines and the coefficients on only 
three of the vulnerability measures, other property, savings, and net wealth, remain positive.  
Of the vulnerability measures only net wealth remains significant at the 5% level.  The 
negative coefficients on home ownership and marital status are interesting given that both 
were positively correlated with enterprise income.  The negative correlation with standard 
deviation may stem from greater income diversification, if households occupied by a couple 
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or with home ownership have more diversified income portfolios50.  With efficient income 
diversification households can increase expected income while decreasing the variance, 
thereby explaining the changed signs.  Overall, the estimation of the standard deviation of 
enterprise income provides only weak evidence supporting the prediction of a negative 
relationship between vulnerability and θ.  Only half of the vulnerability measures have 
positive estimated coefficients and only one, net wealth, is significant at the 10% level.   
In sum, estimation of the two principle proxy measures of θ, average microenterprise 
income and the standard deviation of enterprise income, yields weak support of the 
theoretical prediction of a negative relationship between vulnerability and the portion of 
resources households dedicate to the risky enterprise.  It is probable the lack of more 
compelling results stems from weakness in the proxy measures of θ.  The expected income 
and standard deviation of the enterprise portfolio are excellent, intuitive proxies of the 
unobservable θ variable given basic portfolio theory.  The calculation of these measures, 
however, is less than perfect when using only two periods of information across the wide 
expanse of two years.  More robust measures of the enterprise portfolio would be derived 
from longer panel data, and such measures may yield more conclusive evidence on the 
determinants of enterprise choice.  Until such data become available, however, the ACP data 
provide some evidence of a relationship between vulnerability and enterprise choice.   
4.2 Primary Enterprise Sales         
For completeness I repeat the above analysis using average monthly sales and the standard 
deviation of monthy primary enterprise sales as alternative measures of θ.  I estimate both as 
linear functions of the same observables outlined above.  Results of OLS estimation are 
                                                 
50 A positive link between home ownership and income diversification follows empirical evidence from Field 
(2003), who finds that the titling program in Peru enabled household members to move into the workforce 
outside the home. 
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presented in table II.6.  Columns (1) and (2) contain results for average monthly sales.  
Columns (3) and (4) contain results for the standard deviation of monthly sales.      
 One notable difference is the reduction in explanatory power when considering monthly 
primary enterprise sales.  The adjusted R2 falls to the range of 0.04, as opposed to 0.17 for 
average microenterprise income.  Beyond this the results are similar to and more supportive 
of the theoretical predictions than those from microenterprise income.  For average month 
sales all of the 1997 vulnerability measures have positive coefficients and other property 
remains significant at the 1% level.  For the standard deviation of month sales, all of the 
estimated coefficients for the 1997 vulnerability measures are positive and other property is 
significant at the 5% level.  If I have effectively controlled for entrepreneurial skill, the 
results mean lower vulnerability is positively associated with higher average sales and 
variance of sales for the primary enterprise.  If monthly sales of the primary enterprise 
provide good proxy measures for θ, these results provide some evidence of a negative 
relationship between vulnerability and the allocation to a risky enterprise.   
5.  Implications for Microfinance 
The results on the determinants of enterprise choice have strong implications for 
microfinance selection, if the choice of low yield/low risk projects means entrepreneurs 
generate insufficient surpluses to repay microfinance loans.  In this case the determinants of 
enterprise choice are also the determinants of microfinance selection, and can help explain 
why many microfinance institutions face low penetration rates, especially amongst poorer 
households51.  The prevailing assumption is that entrepreneurial skill drives microfinance 
selection52; only talented entrepreneurs apply for and are approved for microfinance loans.  
                                                 
51 Shaw 2004, CGAP 2000  
52 Armendariz and Morduch 2005   
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However vulnerability also may be an important factor in enterprise choice and of 
microfinance selection.  If entrepreneurs choose lower yield projects because they cannot 
take on the risk associated with higher yield projects, vulnerability may be an important 
determinant of non-participation in microfinance programs.    
I explore this possibility by comparing the enterprise profiles of groups in the ACP 
data based on their microfinance status.  Four groups emerge over the two year panel; those 
who have microcredit in 1997 and in 1999 (Still Have), those who had microcredit in 1997 
but do not in 1999 (Dropouts), those who did not have microcredit in 1997 but do in 1999 
(Join MFI) and those who do not have microcredit in either 1997 or 1999 (Never Join).   
Table II.1: Breakdown of 1999 Sample into Four Groups 
 Have Microcredit in ‘99 Do Not Have Microcredit in ‘99 
Have Microcredit in ‘97 
 
219 HHs  
(Still Have) 
87 HHs  
(Dropouts) 
Do Not Have Microcredit in ‘97 64 HHs  
(Join MFI) 
150 HHs  
(Never Join) 
 
From the standpoint of selection the most interesting group is the Never Join; entrepreneurs 
who qualify for ACP loans but who choose not to seek out these loans53.  In the subsequent 
analysis I focus on comparisons between the Still Have and the Never Join groups, the most 
extreme groups in the sample.  Not only are these groups larger, they also should 
demonstrate the greatest differences in behavior.  Additionally, by restricting the comparison 
to households whose microfinance status does not change, we eliminate the potential 
confounding effects of acquiring or losing microfinance credit over the two year period.          
5.1 Differences in Microenterprise Income 
To discern if enterprise choice varies across households with and without microfinance I 
compare the principal proxy measures for θ ; average microenterprise income and the 
                                                 
53 Lack of knowledge about microfinance or ACP is not the driver of no-show behavior as 80% of the Never 
Join group says they are familiar with ACP specifically. 
 37
 
standard deviation of microenterprise income.  If enterprise choice varies we should find 
significant differences in both measures across the Still Have and Never Join groups.     
 I start with simple mean comparisons of average enterprise income and standard 
deviation of enterprise income, presented in table II.7.  Mean values for both are noticeably 
higher for the Still Have group, and robust t-tests54 (p-values for which are shown in table 
II.8) reveal the difference to be significant at the 1% level.  This suggests significant 
differences in enterprise choice exist.  To take the analysis further I compare the distributions 
of the θ measures for each group.  While mean comparisons are useful and necessary, they 
only tell us about one moment of the distribution.  More conclusive statements can be 
derived by tests of the entire distribution of θ measures across the two groups.  The first step 
is to determine if the distributions significantly differ from one another, which is done using 
the Kolmogorov Smirnov test.  The Kolmogorov Smirnov test constructs a statistic based on 
the largest vertical difference between the cumulative density functions of the two 
distributions, which is then used to test the null hypothesis of no difference in the 
distributions.  P-values for Kolmogorov Smirnov tests of average enterprise income and the 
standard deviation of enterprise income are in table II.8.  In all cases the null hypothesis of 
equality can be rejected at the 1% level.  The distributions of both θ measures differ 
significantly across the Still Have and Never Join groups.   
 The final step is to assess if the distribution of the θ measures for the Still Have group 
first order dominates the distribution for the Never Join group.  A distribution A is said to 
first order dominate a distribution B if the cumulative density function for A (GA) is less than 
the cumulative density function for B (GB) at every point along the support [0, b].  That is, 
                                                 
54 Robust t-test used because variance of the distributions of microenterprise income differs across the two 
groups.   
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)()( xGxG BA ≤ for .  Graphically this means the CDF for A always lies to the right 
of the CDF for B; at every x the percentage of distribution A that lies below value x is lower 
than the percentage of distribution B.  If the Still Have distribution exhibits first order 
stochastic dominance over the Never Join distribution, at every possible θ a lower percentage 
of the Still Have group has an actual θ less than or equal to that amount than the Never Join 
group.  For example, if the Still Have distribution of average income first order dominates 
that of the Never Join group, a larger percentage of the Never Join group has average 
incomes below a given threshold than the Still Have group, for every possible threshold.  
This means the distribution of average income for the Still Have group is shifted to the right 
and that θ values are significantly higher not just at the mean or the median, but along the 
entire range.  First order stochastic dominance thus provides the strongest evidence of 
differences in enterprise choice across groups.     
],0[ bx ∈∀
 Comparisons of cumulative density functions for the Still Have and Never Join groups 
are shown in Graph II.2.A.  The left hand panel shows CDFs for average enterprise income 
and the right hand panel shows CDFs for the standard deviation of enterprise income.  For 
both there is clear evidence of first order stochastic dominance.  The distribution for the Still 
Have group lies below that for the Never Join group at every point along the support.  This 
result clearly indicates average and standard deviation of microenterprise income is 
significantly lower for the Never Join group, which implies these entrepreneurs dedicate 
fewer resources to risky entrepreneurial activities than their counterparts with microfinance.  
5.2 Differences in Monthly Sales for the Primary Enterprise  
To complete the analysis I repeat the exercises above using monthly sales for the primary 
enterprise as the basis for θ.  Results of robust t-test for mean equality and Kolmogorov 
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Smirnov test for equality of the distribution are shown in the lower half of table II.8.  Graphic 
tests of first order stochastic dominance are shown in graph II.2.B.   
 The results using monthly sales for the primary enterprise are not as strong as those from 
total microenterprise income.  For average monthly sales both the mean and the entire 
distribution are significantly different at the 1% level across the Still Have and Never Join 
groups.  For the standard deviation of monthly sales, however, mean values do not 
significantly differ at any level.  Furthermore there is no evidence of first order stochastic 
dominance for either average monthly sales or the standard deviation of monthly sales.  The 
CDFs for the Still Have and Never Join group cross at points, making it impossible for one 
distribution to first order dominate the other.  The Still Have distributions may exhibit second 
order dominance, but this is a weaker condition that provides less compelling evidence of 
significant differences in enterprise choice.  Overall, there is less evidence that primary 
enterprise monthly sales differ across groups with and without microfinance.  Given that 
enterprise choice likely occurs at the level of the enterprise portfolio as a whole, however, 
these results do not refute claims that enterprise choice varies across households based on 
their microfinance status.    
 It is important to note that comparison of the θ measures only attempts to show that 
enterprise choice differs across groups with and without microfinance.  The analysis does not 
attempt to ascribe differences to a particular factor, such as credit access, skill or 
vulnerability.  Given the difficulties in disentangling these effects and appropriately 
addressing endogeneity concerns, doing so is outside the scope of this paper.  Nevertheless, 
establishing differences in enterprise choice is an important step in understanding the use of 
microfinance by poor microentrepreneurs.  The differences in enterprise choice between the 
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Still Have and Never Join group may be a function of factors other than the credit itself, in 
which case identifying these factors are pivotal in understanding credit use, or lack thereof.    
6. Conclusion 
This chapter proposes consideration of vulnerability as a critical determinant of enterprise 
choice for poor, urban households.  It argues that lack of entrepreneurial skill and credit may 
be insufficient to explain low productivity of many microenterprises because neither factor 
incorporates risk, a key consideration for poor households.  Using a simple theoretical model 
I show that even after controlling for entrepreneurial skill, more vulnerable households are 
less willing to devote resources to high yield, high risk enterprises over low yield, safe 
alternatives.  Using data from ACP, a large microfinance institution in Peru, I also find 
empirical evidence that more vulnerable households engage in lower yield and lower risk 
projects than their less vulnerable counterparts.  I also argue vulnerability may play an 
important role in determining who seeks out microfinance loans and who does not.  
Comparisons of enterprise choice across groups with and without microfinance find 
significant differences, in particular that households with microfinance engage more in high 
yield, high risk enterprises than households without microfinance.  Given the link between 
vulnerability and enterprise choice, this implies vulnerability also may play a role in 
microfinance selection.         
 From a policy perspective distinguishing between drivers of enterprise choice is 
important if adoption of different enterprises determines where a household lies relative to 
the poverty line.  If the path out of poverty lies in adopting high yield projects, it is crucial to 
understand why some households are unable to engage in opportunities that would increase 
expected income.  Identification of the main barrier to high yield projects also helps guide an 
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appropriate use for poverty reduction funds, with policy recommendations varying greatly 
across candidate explanations.  Under a skill based model of enterprise choice the best use of 
funds is business development services, aimed at improving microentrepreneurs’ business 
acumen.  Under a vulnerability based model of enterprise choice the best use of funds is 
projects that improve households’ ability to smooth consumption across adverse income 
shocks, through increased provision of consumption credit and insurance.  Improved 
understanding of the barriers to entry into high yield projects is important for development 
practitioners and policy makers searching for the best way integrate credit access and skill 
training programs into poverty reduction agendas. 
 Within the literature on poor, urban households this analysis represents an important first 
step in better understanding the determinants of enterprise choice.  The analysis, however, is 
hindered by the limitations of the ACP data, specifically the small number of panel periods.  
More observations across time are needed to better estimate the expected income and 
standard deviation of households’ enterprise portfolios, the variables used to reveal enterprise 
choice in the absence of information on “safe” and “risky” projects.  The measures from the 
ACP sample are decidedly imperfect and more comprehensive data would bolster the 
analysis of links between vulnerability and enterprise choice.  Unfortunately long panel data 
on urban microentrepreneurs are not currently available, but in their absence the ACP data 





Vulnerability as a Determinant of Microfinance Selection  
I.  Introduction 
Roughly 30 years after its inception microfinance has become an increasingly popular part of 
poverty reduction agendas of multilateral organizations, national policy makers, and NGOs.  
An industry that began with the premise of providing working capital loans to poor 
entrepreneurs continues to capture attention and garner proponents.  The industry also draws 
increasing amounts of donor funding, thanks in part to theories about how credit access 
improves welfare, (Eswaran and Kotwal 1990, Morduch 1994, Banerjee 2004), limited 
empirical evidence that expansion of credit reduces poverty (Burgess and Pande 2005, 
Khandker 2003), and a large body of anecdotal evidence55 that microfinance in particular has 
helped some households navigate the road out of poverty.  With the help of significant 
enthusiasm and billions of dollars in donor support the microfinance model has spread 
around the world, and an estimated 3100 microfinance institutions (MFIs) currently operate 
in countries as diverse as Indonesia, Bosnia, Peru and the U.S.  Collectively these institutions 
serve over 92 million clients worldwide, and the numbers continue to grow as many MFIs 
migrate into new services such as savings accounts, remittance management, housing finance 
and microinsurance56.           
Despite dramatic growth, however, there is an infrequently cited phenomenon about 
microfinance which is that many institutions face low penetration rates.  It turns out a 
                                                 
55 Despite much anecdotal evidence of positive impacts of microcredit, there is little undisputed empirical 
evidence, mostly due to lack of data that can appropriately address the problem of selection bias.  See 
Armendariz and Morduch (2005) for an overview of the debate over impact studies.  
56 Figures as of Dec. 31, 2004.  Microcredit Summit Campaign Report 2005 (www.microcreditsummit.org) 
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significant number of potential borrowers never seek out microfinance loans57.  In the case of 
Peru, the country of focus of this analysis, it is estimated that only 5% of all 
microentrepreneurs access credit from MFIs (Berger 2003)58.  This is curious, because if 
microfinance fills an important void in the lives of the poor, as is argued by MFI’s numerous 
proponents, why are so many households not availing themselves of a service that would 
potentially make them better off?  Candidate explanations such as a limited supply of 
microfinance funds, limited demand due the availability of other funding options, or limited 
need for working capital finance generally fall flat when put to the data.  Something else 
must help explain the extent of non participation behavior.   
The standard argument is that differential endowments of entrepreneurial skill explain 
the puzzle of microfinance selection.  High skill entrepreneurs generate sufficient returns on 
entrepreneurial projects to service microfinance loans and therefore seek out this credit, 
while low skill entrepreneurs generate insufficient returns and decide to stay away.  While 
skill likely plays a role, the flaw in this argument is that it ignores risk altogether, a 
fundamental driver of poor households’ behavior.  Only if the level of risk is constant across 
projects and tolerance for risk constant across entrepreneurs can skill represent the only 
barrier to high yield projects and microfinance.  It is highly unlikely, however, that high and 
low yield projects have the same level of risk or that tolerance for risk is constant given 
different levels of wealth and access to credit and insurance.  Risk is so significant a 
consideration for many poor households, in fact, that even after removing the skill barrier 
                                                 
57 Studies of Kenya and Tanzania estimate penetration rates of 1% (CGAP 2000), while studies in Brazil 
estimate penetration rates of 2% (BNDES 2002).  In Bolivia, the most penetrated microfinance market in Latin 
America, it is estimated only 28% of potential borrowers are reached (IDB 2004).   
58 In 1997 ACP had roughly 30,000 clients.  It is estimated there were 600,000 microentrepreneurs in Lima at 
the time, meaning ACP reached only 5% of the Lima market (Campion, Dunn and Arbuckle 2001).  Although 
this estimate, along with others, overstates the extent of underpenetration by classifying all microentrepreneurs 
as potential clients, the client base is sufficiently low relative to the universe of micro-entrepreneurs to indicate 
a substantial number of households remain untouched by the “microfinance revolution”.     
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many entrepreneurs likely would continue to avoid high yield projects and microfinance.  
Perhaps, then, the something else driving microfinance selection is the ability to manage risk. 
This chapter argues that vulnerability, defined as the inability to smooth consumption 
across adverse income shocks, is an additional factor that drives microfinance selection and 
partially explains low participation rates59.  Households with greater ability to manage risk 
might choose to engage in higher yield projects and seek microfinance credit, while those 
less able to manage risk opt out of both.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, while the 
idea that vulnerability to risk is linked to income choice is not novel, the extension of this 
rationale to an urban setting and exploration of the implications for microfinance programs is 
unique.  These extensions are important given the increasing recognition of the size of the 
urban, microenterprise sector in generating employment and income in the developing world, 
and new questions about whether or not access to credit, particularly microfinance, is 
sufficient to achieve poverty reduction goals.  By examining potential links between 
vulnerability, project choice and microfinance it might be possible to better understand how 
urban households successfully exit poverty and the importance of microfinance, and formal 
credit in general, in this process.   
The chapter provides a theoretical and empirical investigation into the impact of 
vulnerability on microfinance selection.  It first explores the theoretical dimension, 
developing a model in which entrepreneurs choose between a high yield/high risk enterprise 
and microfinance and a low yield/low risk enterprise and no microfinance.  The model finds 
that even after controlling for skill and wealth, at higher levels of vulnerability entrepreneurs 
                                                 
59 Other definitions of vulnerability include: the “the likelihood that a shock will result in a decline in well-
being” (2000/2001 World Development Report); or “the existence and extent of a threat of poverty and 




reject the high yield enterprise and microfinance for the safe option.  The model also predicts 
that while vulnerability is a determinant of microfinance selection, it matters less for high 
skill and high wealth entrepreneurs.        
I then test the theoretical predictions using the ACP data on microentrepreneurs in 
Lima, Peru used in the first chapter.  In logit estimations of microfinance selection I find 
positive evidence that vulnerability negatively impacts microfinance selection.  More 
vulnerable entrepreneurs are found to be anywhere from 7% to 35% less likely than their less 
vulnerable counterparts to select into microfinance programs.  These findings suggest 
vulnerability to risk is an important determinant of behavior for potential microfinance 
borrowers and may help explain low participation rates. 
The chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 2 develops a theoretical model that predicts 
vulnerability negatively impacts microfinance selection.  Section 3 describes the data, 
including information on ACP, the loans offered by this institution, alternative sources of 
financing, and discussion of concerns about the vulnerability measures particular to the 
analysis of microfinance selection.  Section 4 estimates the determinants of microfinance 
participation using the full sample of households from the 1997 survey round.  Section 5 
estimates the determinants of microfinance selection using the balanced panel.  Section 6 
concludes 
2. Theoretical Model 
This section develops a model of microfinance selection that shows that even after 
controlling for skill and wealth, entrepreneurs with less ability to smooth consumption across 
negative income shocks do not select microfinance credit.  It also shows that vulnerability is 




Consider a two period model in which risk-averse entrepreneurial households (referred to as 
entrepreneurs) make decisions to maximize expected lifetime utility.  Entrepreneurs begin 
period 1 with an exogenous skill endowment that can take one of two values: =high skill, 
or =low skill.  Entrepreneurs also being period 1 with an exogenous endowment of liquid 
wealth, which is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over the range 
HT
LT
],[ WW .  Liquid 
wealth can be thought of as household durables or low yielding savings, such as cash stashed 
at home.  All values earn zero interest.  It is important to include wealth in the model to 
distinguish between risk preferences and vulnerability as drivers of behavior.  The 
willingness to take on risky projects is negatively related to a household’s level of risk 
aversion, which, depending on the utility function, declines in wealth.  Vulnerability, 
meanwhile, encompasses the ability to manage risk, which is distinct from risk aversion.  
Wealth plays a role in vulnerability, but so do other factors like access to consumption credit 
and insurance.  As such, households with equal levels of wealth and risk aversion might 
make very different choices if their ability to manage negative income shocks varies60.   
Entrepreneurs can choose one of two entrepreneurial projects; a risky enterprise (RE) 
and a safe enterprise (SE).  The risky enterprise requires working capital to operate, which 
must come from borrowing since liquid wealth is insufficient to meet these needs.  
Microfinance is the only source of external working capital finance in the model, such that 
entrepreneurs wishing to engage in the risky enterprise must take out a microfinance loan. 
The microfinance institution (MFI), on the other hand, cannot view skill and distinguish 
entrepreneurial types and therefore lends the same amount ( ) and charges the same MF
                                                 
60 See Dercon (2005) for a more detailed discussion of risk preferences and vulnerability. 
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interest rate (b) to all borrowers who meet the collateral requirement equal to W .  Since all 
entrepreneurs meet the collateral requirements, supply concerns are irrelevant in the model61.       
Entrepreneurs choose an enterprise at the beginning of period 1.  For the safe 
enterprise returns are constant across skill and state realizations.  For the risky enterprise 
returns are uncertain and depend on the state of nature, realized immediately after the 
enterprise is chosen.  There are two possible realizations, a good state and a bad state, and the 
probability of each depends on skill.  The probability of a good state is pH for a high skill 
entrepreneur and pL for a low skill entrepreneur, where pH > pL.  Gross returns are:  
G
RER=   w/probability =         (1) Tp
B
RER=  w/probability = )1( Tp−        
=    w/ probability =1       (2) GSER
The risky enterprise has a higher return than the safe enterprise in a good state but a lower 









RETRE RpRpRE )1()( −+= T and the returns are such that the expected return of the 
risky enterprise is greater than that for the safe enterprise for both skill types.      




RE RRERE >> )()(
To ensure households find it optimal to engage in entrepreneurial activity rather than to live 
off of wealth I assume the safe enterprise return is greater than all levels of liquid wealth: 
   WWRSE >>          (4) 
After gross returns from each enterprise are realized entrepreneurs make decisions 
about loan repayment.  The microfinance institution offers no repayment flexibility and if a 
borrower fails to repay MFb )1( + at the end of the first period, two things occur.  First, the 
                                                 
61 This assumption is necessary because the goal is to explain why entrepreneurs who qualify for loans choose 
not to participate, not why access might differ. 
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borrower is barred from any future loans from the microfinance institution, which means she 
must abandon the risky enterprise in the second period.  Second, the microfinance institution 
seizes liquid wealth (W ) placed as collateral.  Although collateral seizure is not standard 
practice for many microfinance institutions, with only two periods it is difficult to generate 
the dynamic incentives that usually ensure no strategic default (Armendariz and Morduch 
2005, Alexander 2006).     
Net returns from the risky enterprise at the end of the first period depend on 
repayment decisions.  If a good state is realized the net return from the risky enterprise is 
positive.  If a bad state is realized the net return from the risky enterprise is zero. 
0)1( >+− MFbRGRE     w/ prob      (5) Tp
0)1( =+− MFbR BRE   w/ prob )1( Tp−     
At the beginning of the second period entrepreneurs again choose projects.  Similar to several 
models of vulnerability and crop choice I assume certain second period income from both 
enterprises (Eswaran and Kotwal 1989, Morduch 1994).  For the risky enterprise certain 
second period income equals expected first period income.  This generates the incentive for 
entrepreneurs to continue with the risky enterprise if a bad state is realized, as it leads to 
higher, certain second period income.  Finally, an entrepreneur cannot take out a 
microfinance loan in the second period if she did not do so in the first period.  This 
assumption allows us to focus on only one period of decision making.  
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Net income under different scenarios is outlined in the following tree:     
    





(6) says that certain second period income from the risky enterprise is greater for high skill 
entrepreneurs than for low skill entrepreneurs, and both are greater than income from the safe 
enterprise.  It also says the difference between second period safe and risky income is such 
that the return from the safe enterprise is greater than half the return from the risky 
enterprise.  This ensures the difference between the safe and risky enterprise is not overly 
large.  Finally, I assume interest and return realizations are such that the difference between 
net income of the risky and safe enterprise is greater than the difference between loan 
repayment and the value of seized collateral.  This generates a no-default equilibrium and is 
necessary due to the inability to generate dynamic repayment incentives over two periods.   
  WMFbRMFbRE SE
T
RE −+>−+− )1())1()((       (7) 
2.2 Vulnerability, Consumption Credit and No Default      
Up until this point entrepreneurs have no direct source of consumption credit in the case of a 
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cover consumption, as diversion of loan funds to consumption leaves entrepreneurs with 
insufficient working capital to operate the risky enterprise and zero income.  Explicitly 
outlining consumption credit is important because if a bad state is realized and an 
entrepreneur engaged in the risky enterprise repays the microfinance loan, she will not have 
any income in the first period.  Without consumption credit the entrepreneur must use liquid 
wealth to cover first period consumption.  While this is a realistic scenario, it yields the 
unsatisfactory conclusion that the ability to smooth consumption across an adverse income 
shock depends only on wealth.  In reality, however, the ability to smooth consumption also 
depends on access to consumption credit and insurance, which may be uncorrelated with 
wealth.  For example, informal credit and insurance networks may be a function of the 
number of family and friends nearby, which may be unrelated to wealth62.  To further our 
understanding of vulnerability’s impact on microfinance selection I assume no correlation 
between access to consumption credit and wealth.     
 Consumption credit is defined as: , where ))1()(( MFbREγ TRE +− ]1,0[∈γ     (8) 
γ comes from informal sources, such as a spouse or partner, family and friends, or 
moneylenders, and carries no interest63.  γ is the measure of vulnerability, as it dictates the 
portion of certain second period income an entrepreneur can borrow in the first period.  
Higher values of γ mean an entrepreneur has greater ability to smooth consumption and is 
less vulnerable.  Lower values of γ mean an entrepreneur has less ability to smooth 
consumption and is more vulnerable.   
                                                 
62 In the data informal networks are the principal source of consumption credit.  Also, the correlation between 
measures of informal networks and household wealth are very low, supporting the theoretical prediction of no 
correlation.   
63 In practice we usually observe zero interest rates on loans from family, friends and ROSCAs.  The implicit 
costs usually come from the expectation of reciprocal lending in the future (Dunn and Arbuckle 2001).  
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 Prior to assessing optimal enterprise and financing choices it is necessary to establish 
that default never prevails in the first period64.  This is done through comparison of 
intertemporal budget constraints.  In the case of a good state realization, if an entrepreneur 
does not default, the intertemporal budget constraint is:   
       (9) WMFbRERcc TRE
G
REGG ++−+=+ ))1(2)((21
If an entrepreneur defaults wealth placed as collateral is seized and the entrepreneur cannot 
engage in the risky enterprise in the second period.  The intertemporal budget constraint is: 
WWRRcc SE
G
REGG −++=+ 21       (10) 
No default prevails if MFbWRMFbRE SE
T
RE )1())1()(( +>+−+−   (11) 
which always holds according to assumption (7).  Second period income from the risky 
enterprise is sufficiently greater than that from the safe enterprise such that defaulting is 
always suboptimal.      
 In the case of a bad state realization first period income equals zero.  If the entrepreneur 
does not default, the intertemporal budget constraint is: 
      (12)  WMFbRERcc TRE
B
REGG ++−+=+ ))1(2)((21
If the entrepreneur defaults, the intertemporal budget constraint is:  
 WWRRcc SE
B
REGG −++=+ 21        (13) 
No-default prevails if MFbWRMFbRE SE
T
RE )1())1()(( +>+−+−   (14) 
which again holds because of (7).  In all cases entrepreneurs who choose the risky enterprise 
in the first period prefer to do so in the second period, making default suboptimal. 
                                                 
64 There is no penalty beyond collateral seizure for default in the second period, which means many 
microfinance borrowers might find second period default optimal.  To avoid this it is possible to introduce an 
additional sanction, such as profit seizure.  However, since second period default does not change the dynamics 
of the model, introducing additional assumptions to ensure it doesn’t happen is not necessary.    
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2.3 Entrepreneur’s Decisions  
We can now analyze optimal enterprise and financing choices for entrepreneurs.  In each 
period, after income from the enterprise is received, entrepreneurs choose consumption to 
maximize expected lifetime utility, which is additively separable in each component, and 
expressed as:       (15) )()( 21 cEuδcEuEU +=
Atemporal utility is increasing and strictly concave in that period’s consumption and δ is the 
degree time preference.  To abstract from concerns about differing degrees of time preference 
I assume all entrepreneurs weigh first and second period consumption equally, and that the 
degree of time preference equals one.     
 I start by analyzing utility under the safe enterprise.  If an entrepreneur selects the safe 
enterprise, she chooses consumption in each period to maximize the problem:   
         (16)  )()(max 21 cucuEUc +=
  st. WRc SE +≤1  
       )( 12 SESE RcWRc +−+≤
It is easy to show that WRcc SE 5.021 +== solves the maximization problem and that total 
lifetime utility equals .        (17) )5.0(2 WRu SE +
 Lifetime utility under the risky enterprise, unlike the safe enterprise, depends on skill (T) 
and vulnerability (γ).  I start by analyzing utility in a bad state and consider a “non-
vulnerable” entrepreneur; an entrepreneur whose γ=1.  This entrepreneur can borrow all of 
second period income and can perfectly smooth consumption across a negative income 
shock.  This household maximizes:   
         (18)  )()(max 21 cucuEUc +=
  st. ,     where ))1()((1 MFbREγWc
T
RE +−+≤ 1=γ  
      ,   where 12 ))1()()(1( cWMFbREγc
T
RE −++−−≤ 1=γ  
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It is easy to show lifetime utility equals  (19)  )5.0))1(((5.0(2 WMFbREu TRE ++−
From (8) this is lower than lifetime utility under the safe enterprise (17).  Since this is the 
case for non-vulnerable entrepreneurs, it is also true of vulnerable entrepreneurs as lifetime 
utility declines further as γ falls below 1.  In a bad state all households, regardless of their 
level of vulnerability, wealth or skill are better off under the safe enterprise.     
 If a good state households maximize:   
         (20)  )()(max 21 cucuEUc +=
  st.  WMFbRc GRE ++−≤ ))1((1





Lifetime utility in this case equals   (21) )5.0))1(2)((5.0(2 WMFbRREu GRE
T
RE ++−+
It is easy to confirm that (21) is greater than lifetime utility under the safe enterprise (17).  In 
a good state all households are better off under the risky enterprise.     
 To establish the connection between vulnerability and microfinance selection 
(entrepreneurs only select microfinance if they choose the risky enterprise) I compare 
expected lifetime utility under the risky option for non-vulnerable and vulnerable 
entrepreneurs. Under the risky enterprise entrepreneurs solve:  
 )]()()[1()]()([max 2121 BBTGGTc cucupcucupEU +−++=    (22) 
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For non-vulnerable entrepreneurs, γ is sufficiently high such that the borrowing constraint 
does not bind.  For these entrepreneurs expected lifetime utility under the risky enterprise is: 















Non-vulnerable entrepreneurs are indifferent between the safe and risky enterprise when (23) 
























(24) says that non-vulnerable entrepreneurs are indifferent between the safe and risky 
enterprises when the probability of a good state equals the ratio of the difference between 
utility under the safe and the risky enterprise in a bad state and the difference between utility 
under the risky enterprise in a good and bad state.  The value of  depends on the degree of 
curvature in the utility function, but for any strictly concave function .  While it is 
not necessary to find an explicit value, it is necessary to establish an acceptable range 
because for , all entrepreneurs prefer the safe enterprise and no microfinance loans.  
In order for the model to generate any predictions about the impact of vulnerability on 
microfinance selection .  This says that for any entrepreneur to choose the risky 





 In the case of vulnerable entrepreneurs γ is low enough such that the borrowing 
constraint binds.  Lifetime expected utility under the risky option for these entrepreneurs is:   















By assuming a value  it is possible to solve for the level of vulnerability, , at 
which a vulnerable entrepreneur is indifferent between the safe and risky enterprise. γ solves: 

















To show vulnerability negatively impacts microfinance selection it is sufficient to show  
exists and lies between zero and one.  This is simple given the assumptions about p
γ̂
T and the 
differences between safe and risky enterprise income.  γ determines the critical level of 
vulnerability below which entrepreneurs are better off with safe enterprise and no 
microfinance.  Entrepreneurs with 
ˆ
γγ ˆ<  are too vulnerable to manage the risky enterprise 
and do not select microfinance.  Entrepreneurs with  are better able to manage the risky 
enterprise and select microfinance.  This produces the key result of the model: 
γγ ˆ≥
Even after 
controlling for skill and wealth, vulnerability negatively impacts the probability an 
entrepreneur selects microfinance.      
   Equation (26) also has important implications for the relationship between vulnerability, 
skill and wealth.  For skill, since the probability of a good state is greater for high skill 
entrepreneurs (pH>pL) the threshold level of vulnerability is lower for high skill 
entrepren l ( LTHT γγ == < ˆˆ ).  For an equal level of vulnerability high skill 
entrepreneurs are more likely to select microfinance than low skill entrepreneurs.  This is t
second result of the model: Vulnerability weighs less heavily in the microfinance selection 
decision for low skill entrepreneurs than for high s
eurs as wel
he 
kill entrepreneurs.     
 For wealth, total differentiation of (26) illustrates how the threshold level of 
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The sign of (28) depends only on the last term, , as all of the other terms 
are positive.  If households are vulnerable they cannot smooth consumption across a negative 
income shock, and first period consumption is greater than second period consumption 
( ).  Given concave utility this implies , which means 
)](')('[ 2 ,
1














This is the third key result of the model: While vulnerability matters for all wealth types, it 
matters less for high wealth entrepreneurs than for low wealth entrepreneurs.  For equal 
levels of vulnerability more wealthy entrepreneurs are more likely to select microfinance 
than less wealthy entrepreneurs.  However, even entrepreneurs with the highest level of 
wealth,W , will reject the risky enterprise and microfinance if their vulnerability is 
sufficiently high.         
 In sum the model predicts:  1) Even after controlling for skill and wealth, if vulnerability 
is sufficiently high entrepreneurs do not choose microfinance loans; 2) Vulnerability plays 
less of a role in microfinance selection as entrepreneurial skill increases; and 3) Vulnerability 
plays less of a role in microfinance selection as wealth increases.  I empirically test these 
predictions in the subsequent sections. 
3.    Description of the Data 
To test the theoretical predictions I employ the same Peruvian data used in the first chapter.  
To re-iterate, the data come from a USAID sponsored program to assess the impact of 
microfinance services, carried out with Accion Comunitaria del Peru (ACP, which became 
MiBanco in 199865), a large, profit-oriented microfinance institution with operations 
exclusively in Lima66.  Data on clients of ACP and a comparison group was collected in two 
                                                 
65 For discussion of the transformation of ACP to Mibanco see Campion, Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) 
66 In 2000 Mibanco opened its first office outside of Lima, in Chincha 
 57
 
periods, August of 1997 and again in July/August of 1999.  The 1997 survey includes 401 
clients and 300 non clients, and the 1999 survey includes 306 clients and 214 non clients.   
 An important feature of the data set is the way the comparison group was collected.  A 
pool of non-clients was randomly drawn from a sample of microentrepreneurs in the same 
neighborhoods, with similar enterprise and household characteristics as their microfinance 
counterparts.  Two prerequisites for the comparison sample were made: 1) no member of the 
household could have microfinance credit from any source and 2) at least one of the 
enterprises of the household must have been in operation for at least six months.  The latter 
prerequisite ensures the comparison group qualifies as potential clients, as ACP requires that 
the enterprise on which the loan is taken out have at least six months of operating history.  
Thus all of the non-clients meet eligibility requirements for ACP loans. 
 Given this paper focuses on a particular type of credit offered to poor entrepreneurs, it is 
critical to understand the terms of ACP loans and how they vary from other types of credit.  
Looking first at ACP loans; at the time of the survey the principal product offered by ACP is 
a working capital loan, with typical loan lengths ranging from 6 weeks to 6 months.  Average 
loan size in 1997 is 1,021 soles (approximately $384) and loans are paid back over short term 
intervals, typically on a bi-weekly or monthly basis67.  Loans are granted either to a group or 
to an individual, the requirement for the latter being home ownership or a guarantor with 
proof of home ownership68.  Loans could be taken out by only one household member and 
for the purpose of only one existing microenterprise69.  To meet the requirement of a 6 month 
                                                 
67 For ACP clients in the sample 30% re-paid loans on a bi-weekly basis while 58% re-paid on a monthly basis. 
68 For group loans at least one group member must own their home.  In 1997 incidence of home ownership 
amongst group loan borrowers is 84%, while incidence amongst individual borrowers with a guarantor is 81%.  
ANOVA estimates show no significant difference in home ownership, savings incidence or marital status across 
different microfinance loan types in 1997.    
69 By 1999 80% of entrepreneurs without microfinance have heard not just of microfinance, but of ACP.  
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minimum operating history, borrowers must provide proof of enterprise duration, including 
electricity or telephone bills, receipts from suppliers, or registration certificates with the 
municipality or tax authority. (Dunn and Arbuckle 2001)     
 While loan use is not monitored by the MFI and a great deal of fungibility has been 
documented70, the short maturity lengths combined with frequent payback intervals generally 
mean microfinance loans are directed to short-term business needs71.  ACP client interviews 
confirm this.  When asked about loan use, one respondent replied:   
“I don’t know what we bought (with the last loan), but it has always been inventory, 
you know?  Because you can’t spend it on your house or you can’t take it and go 
spend it on furniture… You have to make the money produce, because they are going 
to charge interest too, you know?” (Dunn and Arbuckle 2001)   
 
 Microfinance is not the only source of credit for entrepreneurs in the sample72.  The 
other sources, outlined it table III.1, include formal lenders, such as commercial banks, credit 
unions, credit cooperatives, and construction banks, as well as informal lenders, such as 
suppliers, friends, family, moneylenders, and ROSCAS73.  The most frequently cited sources 
are suppliers and family and friends.  A comparison of the terms of these other types of credit 
to those of ACP loans helps elucidate the demand for microfinance, and a discussion of 
interest rates, repayment terms and loan size follows.    
                                                 
70 Fungibility is the use of loan funds for purposes other than those laid out in the loan contract, such as for 
consumption or household investment purposes.  See Gaile and Foster (1996) for evidence of fungibility.  
71Armendariz and Morduch (2005) explain that this type of payback structure can improve loan repayment as 
the timing of payments better matches that of income flows into the household.  This matching can be important 
if borrowers have difficulty saving, due to household demands, pilfering of funds by other household members 
(women keeping funds away from their husbands) or the absence of saving vehicles.  
72The most important type of credit for entrepreneurs is working capital finance.  Working capital is defined as 
the difference between current assets and liabilities and this difference is negative if a firm has a gap between 
payments for goods produced and payments on inputs.  A germane example is a small grocer who must 
purchase inventory in advance of sale.  If working capital is negative the firm can finance the difference 
internally, with retained profits, or externally, with formal or informal loans.  Although retained profits carries 
fewer explicit costs, dependence on this to finance working capital limits everyday operations and restricts 
enterprise growth, leading many businesses to seek external finance.        
73 Rotation Savings and Credit Associations. See Armendariz and Morduch (2005) and Besley, Coate and Loury 
(1993). The latter note that ROSCAS are predominantly used to save for large, indivisible durable goods, rather 
than to finance ongoing business expenses.  
 59
 
In the case of interest rates, ACP, dissimilar to many microfinance institutions, 
charges unsubsidized and market determined interest rates.  At the time of the survey 
nominal, annual rates were close to 50%, which translates into estimated real interest rates of 
42.5% in 1997 and 47.5% in 1999.74  According to Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) ACP’s 
interest rates are comparable to those charged by other financial institutions enga
microlending
ged in 
                                                
75 such as banks, credit unions and other microfinance institutions, lower than 
those charged by moneylenders and pawnshops, and higher than those charged by family, 
friends and ROSCAs76.  Although there is no information on the costs of supplier credit, the 
most cited source of external finance, data from small firms in several developed countries 
suggest ACP’s rates equal or lie below those charged by suppliers.  For example, Cuñat 
(2006) finds supplier credit rates in the range of 44% for small firms in the U.S. and U.K.   
One concern may be that real rates above 40% are exorbitant and fully explain why 
many entrepreneurs do not seek microfinance loans.  It turns out, however, that ACP’s 
interest rates are consistent with those charged for similar types of short-term, working 
capital loans within Peru77 and within some developed countries78.  They are also consistent 
 
74 According to the Central Bank of Peru, annual inflation was 8.5% in 1997, and 3.5% in 1999.  
75 “Microloans’ refer to loans that are significantly smaller in size than those typically lent by banks and 
extended to borrowers with collateral that is insufficient to qualify for standard bank loans.  
76 Interest rates tend to be extremely low and in some instances zero for loans from family and friends and 
ROSCAS, although for both implicit costs partially mitigate the low rates.  Loans from family and friends often 
carry the expectation of reciprocation while loans from ROSCAs depend on the order given and the timing of 
the distribution might not coincide with business needs (Dunn and Arbuckle 2001).  
77 According to the Central Bank of Peru (BCRP) nominal short-term rates for the general banking sector 
averaged 31.1% in 1997 and 27.6% in 1999.  Unlike the banks included in these averages, microfinance 
institutions lend to borrowers with zero or very little collateral and extend loans of significantly smaller size.  
As a result they generally charge much higher interest rates (CGAP 2002, Armendariz and Morduch 2005). 
78 Research on the use of supplier credit in the U.S. and U.K. (Cuñat 2006) finds the implicit costs of standard 
contracts for manufacturers in these countries are close to 44% a year, and in some cases are as high as 358%.  
This is quite expensive for countries with deep and well functioning financial markets. Yet supplier credit 
continues to be a popular financing source for small and medium sized firms in the U.S. and U.K.  
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with the returns several microentrepreneurs likely generate from capital79.  As a result, high 
interest rates probably explain only a small portion of non participation behavior.   
 In the case of repayment terms, ACP is much more restrictive than the other sources, 
principally informal ones.  Similar to most microfinance institutions ACP has very strict 
repayment terms for both group and individual loans.  If a borrower is delinquent they are 
charged a daily fee, and if a borrower defaults they are barred forever from future loans from 
the institution.  Not only is there no option for late repayment, there is a severe penalty for 
doing so80.  This compares to terms that likely are more flexible for supplier credit and loans 
from family and friends, the two most cited credit sources81.   
Despite market interest rates and more restrictive terms, microfinance loans have two 
key advantages over other credit sources, principally informal ones.  The first is the ability to 
provide larger and more frequent loans than informal sources.  As with any financial 
intermediary the pool of loanable funds is greater for an MFI than for informal lenders such 
as suppliers, moneylenders, and family or friends.  The information in table III.1 confirms 
this: median loan sizes for ACP surpass those from all other sources except other financial 
intermediaries.  Additionally, in interviews several clients cite larger loan size as an 
                                                 
79 Using data on urban microentrepreneurs in Mexico, McKenzie and Woodruff (2006) find real monthly 
returns that range from 10-15% for small to medium size investments and 2-3% for larger investments.  Udry 
and Anagol (2006) estimate returns to capital for the informal sector in Ghana and find real rates in the order of 
60%. 
80 Most MFIs eternally bar borrowers from any future loans in the case of default.  Alexander (2006) argues this 
severe penalty is unnecessary to create the dynamic incentives that are thought to contribute to high repayment 
rates.  She presents a model in which the punishment phase for default can be less than infinity and still produce 
repayment rates that allow microfinance institutions to break even.   
81 Although there is no information on the terms of either, in the case of loans from family and friends it is 
likely repayment terms are more flexible.  In the case of supplier credit, information from standard contracts in 
the U.S. (Cuñat 2006) suggests these contracts also have more flexible repayment terms.  In a representative 
survey of small U.S. firms, 46% report paying back suppliers after the due date and 43% report no penalties for 
late payment.  The same firms report more inflexible repayment terms for banks loans.  Translating this to the 
ACP sample, the option of late payment may explain the high incidence of supplier finance for entrepreneurs, 
even amongst those with multiple sources of bank and microfinance credit.  
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advantage of borrowing from ACP, while dropouts mention the difficulty in cobbling 
together the same quantity of funds from other sources.   
The second advantage is the guarantee of continual access to credit as long as 
outstanding debts are serviced on time.  Many microfinance institutions have renewable loan 
contracts and, in the case of ACP, the client can receive a new loan the same day a previous 
loan is repaid.82  Furthermore, with prompt repayment many MFIs grant borrowers access to 
an increasing pool of funds.  The guarantee of access to continual and increasing credit likely 
is not replicated by informal lenders due to limited and more variable sources of funds. 
3.1 Microfinance and Project Choice   
As a result of larger loans and more continual access, microfinance can finance projects, 
particularly those with larger working capital requirements, which other credit sources 
cannot.  The theoretical model further assumes that projects with larger working capital 
requirements have higher returns and risk than those with lower working capital 
requirements.  Several client interviews justify this assumption.  For the microentrepreneurs 
in this sample high yield/ high risk projects oftentimes translate into larger, more expensive 
inventory items that have higher expected return but also more risk.  A former ACP client 
provides an example:    
“When Pepa was receiving loans… she would use them primarily to invest in high 
margin clothing for sale.  She saw the loans as a separate credit for her mobile 
clothing business, and used them only for her (other home based retail business 
during peak sales seasons)… Credit helped Pepa invest in clothing, which while 
requiring larger investments, provided higher returns.” (Dunn and Arbuckle 2001)   
 
                                                 
82 Armendariz and Morduch (2005), in summarizing their own and others’ work, explain that this automatic roll 
over generates the dynamic incentives that help explain high payback for many MFIs despite little or no 
collateral.  When funding is automatically extended and sometimes increased, the cost of defaulting rises for the 
borrower.  Alexander (2006) also presents a model of dynamic incentives in individual loan contracts.  
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Pepa is later forced to dropout of ACP due to her husband’s payment delinquency.  After 
loosing access to the larger microfinance loans she must abandon her clothing business due 
to an inability to procure the same quantity of funds from other sources (Dunn and Arbuckle 
2001).  Another ACP client provides a similar story.  She comments:  
“With loans you can buy other things that take longer to move, but which leave you 
with more profit.” (Dunn and Arbuckle 2001)  
 
 These quotes illustrate how microfinance, as a result of larger loan size, can be used to 
fund high risk, high return projects.  The specific example of bulky inventory also reveals 
why microfinance borrowers might be limited to entrepreneurs with sufficient support to 
cover loan repayments and consumption needs if an adverse shock, such as robbery or an 
unanticipated sales decline, occurs.    
3.2 Alternative Hypotheses for Microfinance Selection: Supply     
This paper focuses on a demand side explanation for non participation in microfinance 
programs and in so doing it implicitly assumes limited supply of microfinance loans is not 
behind limited outreach.  This assumption may be problematic if microfinance institutions 
have limited sources of funds and are at full capacity in terms of loan extension or if the 
entrepreneurs who don’t participate are lower quality borrowers and would likely be rejected 
if they applied for a loan.  In both cases the assumption that entrepreneurs without 
microfinance have access to this credit breaks down, jeopardizing the vulnerability 
hypothesis.  Additional information on ACP/Mibanco addresses both concerns.  In the case 
of the supply of loanable funds, in the year 2000, one year after the final survey round, 
Mibanco reports using only 65% of an approved credit line and states this is an improvement 
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over previous years83.  This clearly shows the institution has excess lending capacity and that 
limited supply of funds is not driving low penetration rates.   
 The case of high rejection rates is more difficult to address since we do not know if 
entrepreneurs without microfinance would be accepted for a loan if they applied.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests they would be.  On paper all meet the requirements for ACP loans and the 
institution, similar to most microfinance institutions, has fairly low rejection rates84.  
Researchers involved with data collection believe most of the entrepreneurs without 
microfinance would be approved for a loan.  Furthermore, comparisons of entrepreneurs who 
join microfinance programs by the second panel period to entrepreneurs who never join 
reveal few observable differences between the two.  In logit analyses only other property and 
informality status in 1999 are significant in predicting which entrepreneurs join microfinance 
programs.  While this indicates we have little information about factors leading one group to 
join microfinance programs, it also indicates that based on the same factors observable to the 
lender, entrepreneurs without microfinance are fairly indistinguishable from counterparts 
who join microfinance programs.  This suggests that while rejection rates are a concern, they 
probably are not the major cause of low microfinance participation.    
3.3. Vulnerability and Skill Measures 
To measure vulnerability and skill I use the same variables outlined in chapter 2.  The 
vulnerability measures include savings incidence, liquid wealth, home ownership, other 
property, marital status and Time in Lima.  The skill measures include variables for 
secondary education and education above a secondary level, and experience, as measured by 
                                                 
83 Information from Mibanco’s annual reports, available on www.themix.org.  Conversations with practitioners 
reveal excess capacity is not an exclusive domain of ACP/Mibanco and that other large, microfinance 
institutions oftentimes have access to more funds than they can lend.  
84 See The Microfinance Gateway for discussion of rejection rates.  
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the maximum amount of time any business of the household has been in operation.  Average 
values for all variables are presented in tables III.2 and III.5.   Below I also address some 
concerns about several of the vulnerability measures that are particular to the analysis of 
microfinance selection.      
The first concern about the vulnerability measures is that household wealth, savings, 
home ownership, and other property are all bi-products of microfinance participation and 
therefore endogenous85.  If this is true reverse causality bias clouds any information about the 
impact of vulnerability on microfinance selection.  In the case of savings, home ownership 
and other property, ACP’s limited product offerings during the survey period quell most 
endogeneity concerns.  In 1997 and 1999 ACP only offered short-term, working capital 
loans.  It did not offer a savings product, nor did it offer mortgage loans or any type of long 
term, high principal loan that would be needed to buy property.  Furthermore, in the case of 
savings, questions on saving behavior reveal that few entrepreneurs save through demand 
deposits with financial intermediaries.  The majority save by stashing money in their house 
or through ROSCAs.  It therefore is unlikely savings, home ownership, and other property 
are simply weak proxies for microfinance status and that reverse causality bias is significant.  
Unfortunately the same cannot be said of durables and vehicles, as microfinance 
loans frequently are used to finance these purchases.  This means microfinance participation 
likely governs asset values and that endogenity concerns are quite valid.  Instrumenting for 
household wealth using a variable that determines assets but does not determine microfinance 
selection would eliminate the reverse causality bias, but a valid instrument does not emerge 
from the data.  As a result, household wealth should be viewed as a control rather than an 
                                                 
85 Savings status is a particular concern since many microfinance programs not only offer savings products, but 
require borrowers to maintain positive savings with the institution during the duration of the loan (see 
Armendariz and Morduch 2005).  ACP, however, does not a have forced savings component to its loans. 
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independent vulnerability measure.  In particular its inclusion may control for differences in 
risk preferences, which also dictate project choice and microfinance selection.  Ceteris 
paribus, more risk averse households achieve lower expected utility under the risky 
enterprise and microfinance than their less risk averse counterparts.  Knowing risk 
preferences is impossible, but to the extent that they are a function of wealth, the inclusion of 
wealth may partially control for disparate levels of risk aversion as a determinant of 
microfinance selection.   
The second concern is that the informal network measures proxy for household 
characteristics besides vulnerability that impact microfinance selection.  For marital status 
the concern is that it simply captures the effect of having another working adult in the 
household.  To control for this I include the total number of household members that 
currently work.  The concerns for tenure in Lima are that it captures entrepreneurial 
experience and/or increased knowledge of better projects rather than reduced vulnerability.  
To control for the first concern I use age and entrepreneurial experience, as measured by the 
longest tenure of the household’s microenterprises.  To control for better knowledge of good 
projects I use measures of entrepreneurial skill, outlined below. 
The final concern involves the potential for the informal network measures to actually 
reduce the probability of microfinance selection if loans from family and friends are 
substitutes for enterprise credit from microfinance institutions.  Given the large reliance on 
credit from family and friends, it is possible entrepreneurs with greater informal networks 
can finance their working capital needs via these channels, eliminating the need for 
microfinance credit.  If this holds, and if the importance of informal networks lies more in 
providing substitutes for microfinance than in reducing vulnerability, we may see a negative 
 66
 
relationship between the informal network variables and microfinance participation.  Thus 
there is potential for the empirical estimation to yield signs on marital status and Time in 
Lima opposite those predicted by the theory.               
4. Empirical Estimation of Microfinance Selection: Complete Sample   
I first analyze the determinants of microfinance selection using the complete 1997 sample, 
which includes 701 households.  One benefit of exclusively considering the first survey 
round is a larger sample, as attrition whittles down the original households to 520 by 1999.  
The cost, however, is under-utilization of the additional information provided in the second 
survey round.  This information may be helpful in understanding microfinance selection, and 
therefore I follow this section with a similar analysis using the balanced panel (Section 5).   
To estimate the probability an entrepreneur has microfinance in 1997 I use a random 
utility framework, as suggested by the theoretical model.  As of 1997 entrepreneurs have two 
choices; to select microfinance prior to 1997 (denoted as j) or not to select microfinance prior 
to 1997 (denoted as k).  The probability an entrepreneur chooses j over k is the probability j 
yields higher utility than k.  If utility from a given choice is a linear function of observable 
factors (Xi) and unobservable factors ( ), this probability is: iε
)Pr()Pr( 1997, ikkiijjii εβXεβXjceMicrofinan +>+==                (1) 










)Pr( 1997,   , which is the simple logit model of binary choice.  
The four types of observable components used in the estimation are outlined below.  Mean 
values are presented in table III.2.   
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1) Household characteristics include: the entrepreneur’s gender, the entrepreneur’s age, as 
measured by four age bin dummy variables86; the dependency ratio (number of children 
under 16 to total household members); the total number of working adults in the 
household; and whether or not the entrepreneur was hit with a shock at the household or 
enterprise level in the past two years87.    
2) Enterprise characteristics include: the total number of enterprises run by the household; a 
dummy variable if all the enterprises of the household are informal88; and enterprise 
categories, as defined by eight dummy variables that equal one if a household has an 
enterprise in a certain category.  
3) Vulnerability Measures include: household wealth, as measured by the net value of 
durable good and vehicles; a dummy variable for savings; a dummy variable for home 
ownership; a dummy for control over other property89; a dummy variable if the 
entrepreneur is married or has a partner; and an entrepreneur’s tenure in Lima.   
4) Skill Measures include: dummy variables for secondary or above secondary education 
and the maximum amount of time any enterprise of the household has been in operation.  
 
Results of logit estimation of microfinance status in 1997 based on these observable 
characteristics are presented in Table III.3.  Column (1) presents results including all 
vulnerability measures except wealth and column (2) presents results including wealth.  
Column (3) includes results with interaction terms.  For comparison, results of a linear 
                                                 
86 Age bins are less than 25, between 40 and 60 and above 60.  The left out comparison group is age between 25 
and 40.  The goal is to see if younger and older entrepreneurs behave differently than “middle age” ones.   
87 A shock is defined as “any unexpected or unforeseen event that that occurred in the previous 2 years and that 
had significant negative economic or financial repercussions for the household.”  (Dunn and Arbuckle)  
88 I consider two measures of informality.  The first dummy variable takes a positive value if all of the 
enterprises of a household are informal.  The second is less stringent and takes a positive value if at least one 
enterprise of the household is informal.  The second is considered for robustness in the analysis. 
89 Respondents are asked if they or another household member have another residence in or near Lima.   
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probability model are presented in columns four (4) and five (5).  Reported coefficients on all 
terms are average marginal effects, with the exception of the interaction terms, in which case 
average interaction effects are reported90.    
  The results from logit estimations using 1997 data support the key theoretical 
prediction that vulnerability reduces the probability an entrepreneur seeks out microfinance.  
Four vulnerability measures, home ownership, savings, marital status and time in Lima, are 
significant predictors of microfinance status in 1997.  Home ownership increases the 
probability an entrepreneur has microfinance in 1997 by 19%-25%; savings increases the 
probability by 7%-12%, having a spouse or partner increases the probability by 9-12%, and 
one more year of residence in Lima increases the probability by 0.3%, while 5 more years 
increase the probability by 1.8%.  Taking the first three combined, if an entrepreneur goes 
from zero to positive values for savings, home ownership and marital status, the probability 
she has microfinance in 1997 increases by 35%.  For marital status the results are robust to 
controlling for the number of working household members, implying the importance of 
marriage or partnership goes beyond having another adult in the household91.  For Time in 
Lima, the results are robust to controlling for age and experience, implying tenure impacts 
microfinance selection through some other channel.  Finally, the coefficients on the informal 
network measures are positive despite potential downward bias stemming from the 
substitution of loans from family and friends for microfinance credit.  This further suggests 
the link between these variables and microfinance selection may lie in vulnerability.  
                                                 
90 See Ai and Norton (2003) for discussion of why the interaction effect differs from the marginal effect of the 
interaction term, and appropriate calculation of the former. 
91 In almost all cases the coefficient on marital status declines if it is defined more restrictively (cohabitation not 
included), implying the benefits indeed stem from partnership.   
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 To ensure the positive and significant coefficients on home ownership, savings and 
marital status are not simply statements about wealth and risk aversion rather than 
vulnerability, I estimate the logit model with and without household wealth (columns (1) and 
(2)).  If wealth fully drives the relationships between savings, home ownership, marital status 
and microfinance selection, the coefficients on these variables should change when wealth is 
included.  Comparison of the results in columns 1 (wealth excluded) and 2 (wealth included) 
show this is not the case.  While the estimated marginal effects slightly decline following the 
inclusion of wealth, the reduction is small and all three variables remain significant at the 
10% level.  Therefore it is unlikely the significance of these measures simply shows wealth’s 
influence on microfinance selection.     
 To test the second and third theoretical predictions that vulnerability’s role in selection 
declines in wealth and skill, I include two sets of interaction terms.  The first set interacts 
household wealth with the four main vulnerability measures; home ownership, savings, 
marital status and Time in Lima.  The second set interacts skill, as measured by the 
secondary education dummy, with the same four variables92.  If the theoretical prediction 
holds the signs on these terms should be negative.  Column (3) contains estimation results, 
which overall provide weak evidence supporting the second and third theoretical predictions.  
Consistent with the theory the signs on three of the four wealth and skill interaction 
interaction terms are negative.  This implies wealth and skill reduce the impact of each 
vulnerability measure on microfinance selection.  In all cases, however, the coefficients are 
insignificant, implying that the influence of wealth and skill on the impact of vulnerability is 
indistinguishable from zero.  The lack of significance could stem from the limited sample 
                                                 
92 Given the small sample size I have an interest in limiting the number of interaction terms.  I choose only one 
skill variable to interact and choose education because it seems a stronger proxy measure than experience.   
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size of the ACP data, and a larger data set would likely yield more conclusive results about 
the second order effects of skill and wealth.   
In sum, in the full sample, home ownership, savings, marital status and time in Lima, 
have significant power in predicting microfinance participation in 1997.  While I have tried 
to control for potential sources of bias, it is still possible there are unobservable factors, 
principally the portion of skill not picked up by education and experience, that jointly 
determine the vulnerability measures and microfinance participation.  In the absence of 
sufficient panel periods to use individual fixed effects to better capture these unobserved 
factors, it is only possible to control for sources of bias using observable characteristics.  To 
the degree the observables employed control for the confounding effects of skill, the logit 
results provide strong evidence that vulnerability negatively impacts microfinance selection.   
Section 5: Empirical Model of Microfinance Selection, Balanced Panel  
Although the balanced panel sample is smaller and may differ from the original due to 
attrition, incorporating the information from the second survey round provides a more 
comprehensive analysis of microfinance selection.  This section and the appendix are 
devoted to investigating the determinants of microfinance selection using the balanced panel.     
 I first address concerns that the results from the full 1997 sample are driven by 
observations that drop out of the sample.  I re-estimate the logit model of microfinance in 
1997 on the sub-sample of households that appear in the 1999 estimation93.  The results, 
presented in columns (4), (5) and (6) of table III.6, essentially match those from the 
estimation using the full sample, confirming that the results from the full sample are robust to 
exclusion of households that exit the sample.   
5.1 Empirical Analysis of Microfinance Selection, 1999  
                                                 
93 This is less than 520 households due to non-response on some 1999 enterprise level variables 
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As mentioned in chapter 2, the inclusion of 1999 data yields a more complex breakdown of 
households based on microfinance status as several microfinance clients drop out and several 
non-microfinance clients become clients of Mibanco or another microfinance institution by 
1999.  By 1999 there are four groups of entrepreneurs; those who have microcredit in 1997 
and in 1999 (Still Have), those who had microcredit in 1997 but do not in 1999 (Dropouts94), 
those who did not have microcredit in 1997 but do in 1999 (Join MFI) and those who do not 
have microcredit in either 1997 or 1999 (Never Join).  The breakdown is presented in Table 
II.1 in the previous chapter.   
 With the sequential nature of the decision making process outlined in the panel data a 
nested logit becomes the natural model to estimate microfinance selection.  The difficulty 
with the nested logit, however, is the small size of the Dropout and Join MFI groups.  This is 
problematic because after dividing entrepreneurs into nests based on their 1997 microfinance 
status, within each nest there is insufficient variation to discern the differences between the 
group that has microfinance in 1999 and the group that does not.  As a result the nested logit 
yields little information about the determinants of 1999 microfinance status.  Details of the 
set-up and results of the nested logit estimation are provided in appendix 1.  
 To overcome the problem of limited sample size I turn to a simple logit estimation of 
microfinance status in 1999.  I use the same observables as in the 1997 estimation, but 
employ 1999 values.  Results are presented in Table III.6.  Column (1) presents results 
without household wealth, column (2) presents results with household wealth, and column 
(3) presents results with interaction terms.  Finally, because the Still Have and Never Join 
groups present the starkest contrasts regarding microfinance choice, I estimate a logit model 
                                                 
94 Dropouts are defined as entrepreneurs that have not taken out any microfinance loans since 1997; that is, in 
almost two years  
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of microfinance selection using these two groups.  Results of this estimation are presented in 
table III.7.  Columns (1), (2) and (3) contain results using 1997 variables and columns (4), (5) 
and (6) contain results using 1999 variables.   
 The most striking feature of the estimations of microfinance status using 1999 data is 
that the results are less conclusive those using 1997 data.  In both sets of analyses 1999 
values have significantly less power than their 1997 equivalents in predicting microfinance 
participation.  This is specifically true of the vulnerability measures, of which only marital 
status remains positive and significant in all cases.  Home ownership, savings and time in 
Lima, which were strong predictors of microfinance status in 1997, fail to remain so in 1999.  
The same pattern is observed in the Still Have and Never Join comparison.  1997 values of 
home ownership, savings, marital status and time in Lima are all significant in predicting 
which entrepreneurs have microfinance in both periods (Still Have) and which do not (Never 
Join).  When 1999 values are used, however, only marital status remains significant in all 
cases.  The limited power of 1999 vulnerability measures to predict microfinance status is 
curious, given strong evidence in the 1997 data to the contrary.  Further investigation into the 
differences across the panel periods reveals a possible explanation for this change.               
5.2 Increased Realization of Negative Shocks: The Environment in 1999 vs. 1997 
An important feature of the vulnerability variables is that many are ex-ante measures; they 
largely capture the ability to smooth consumption prior to being hit with a shock.  The degree 
to which the same variables capture vulnerability after a negative shock is realized, however, 
is unclear.  For example, households list savings as the principal mechanism for managing 
adverse events (see Table III.8), which means many likely drain their savings in the wake of 
a negative shock.  Based on savings alone all of these households look more vulnerable ex-
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post than ex-ante.  Some households, however, will have unchanged vulnerability status if 
they maintain the ability to take out consumption loans and thereby smooth consumption 
across a subsequent shock.  So while a decline in savings likely indicates increased 
vulnerability, the extent to which this happens varies across households and remains 
unknown.    
 The difference between ex-ante and ex-post measures turns out to be a concern because 
the 1999 survey round portrays a significantly worse moment in the lives of the ACP 
households than the 1997 survey round.  In 1998 the Peruvian economy entered into 
recession following El Niño, the Asian crisis and Russia’s default and only began to emerge 
from it in the fourth quarter of 1999, after the second survey round95.  According to the 
Central Bank of Peru, from the third quarter of 1997 to the third quarter of 1999 real GDP 
fell by 0.2%.  This compares to an 8.7% increase in real GDP during the two year period 
leading up to September 1997.  The brunt of this contraction came from real internal demand, 
a measure that better captures the situation of urban micro-entrepreneurs since few are 
engaged in export industries.  Between the first and second survey rounds real internal 
demand fell by 6.4%, which compares to an 8.6% increase over the two years leading up to 
the first survey round.   
 Survey questions confirm that the deteriorating macroeconomic environment translated 
into increased negative shocks for ACP entrepreneurs.  The percent of entrepreneurs in the 
balanced panel that report receiving a negative shock increases by 13%, from 44% in 1997 to 
57% in 1999, while the percent living below the poverty line increases by almost 10%96.  In 
                                                 
95See BCRP Annual Reports for 1998 and 1999 and Dunn and Arbuckle (2001) for details on the recession, 
particularly further explanation on the impact of the Asian and Russian crises on Peruvian internal demand.      
96Defined if a household’s consumption per adult equivalent falls below a $2 measure, which is determined by 
the Peruvian statistical agency (INEI).    
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addition, as shown in table III.8, the ranking of most severe shocks changes.  In 1997 only 
17% of households report loss or reduction of income as the most severe shock.  By 1999 this 
increases twofold, further indicating the recession had a direct impact on the entrepreneurs in 
the sample.  There also is evidence that many households liquidated savings in the face of 
adverse events.  In 1999 savings is listed as the main mechanism for managing a negative 
shock, and every group except Join MFI registers a decline in savings incidence over the two 
year period.  The most severe decline occurs in the Still Have group, which largely explains 
why savings ceases to be a significant predictor of microfinance status in 1999.  A similar 
channel to insignificance may be at work for home ownership, although there is weaker 
evidence for this in the data.   
 In light of the inherent difficulties of ex-ante vulnerability measures, it is compelling that 
martial status, one of the measures less likely to change following a negative shock, is the 
variable that remains significant in all cases.  Martial status proves the most robust predictor 
of microfinance status, an interesting result given that I control for working household 
members and the weak correlation with both income and wealth.  This implies having a 
spouse or partner influences microfinance selection through some other channel, potentially 
informal networks.  Indeed, of the vulnerability measures, marital status likely best captures 
the unobservable characteristic that is a household’s access to informal consumption credit.  
As such, despite the fact that home ownership and savings cease to be significant predictors 
of microfinance status in 1999, the empirical evidence supports the contention that 




This paper argues that vulnerability, defined as the inability to smooth consumption across 
adverse income shocks, is a key determinant poor entrepreneurs’ decision to seek 
microfinance loans and a potential explanation for low microfinance participation rates.  In a 
simple theoretical model vulnerability is found to drive some entrepreneurs to reject high 
yield/high risk enterprises and microfinance, even after accounting for skill and wealth.  
Vulnerability is also predicted to weigh less heavily in microfinance decisions for high skill 
and high wealth entrepreneurs.  Using data from ACP, a large microfinance institution in 
Lima, Peru, I find empirical support for the theory that vulnerability drives microfinance 
decisions.  More vulnerable entrepreneurs are significantly less likely to seek microfinance 
than their less vulnerable counterparts.   
 The vulnerability theory outlined in this paper would benefit from further investigation 
using more expansive data sets.  While the ACP data set is one of the few panel data sets on 
urban microentrepreneurs, it is imperfect due to the small sample size and limited number of 
panel periods.  In order to make more conclusive statements about the importance of 
vulnerability it would be helpful to acquire evidence from larger or longer (in the sense of 
panel periods) data sets.       
 Finally, the results of this paper have important implications for microfinance 
institutions and general efforts to expand credit access for the poor.  Despite enthusiasm 
surrounding these efforts, credit expansion has not proved a magic solution to poverty.  
Contrary to the claims of many microfinance proponents, most poor households do not 
appear to be one or two loans away from crossing the poverty line.  Given the credit 
constraints many poor household face and the potential link between these constraints and 
poverty, it is curious that credit outreach programs have had less of an impact than 
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anticipated.  Vulnerability may be one important explanation for this phenomenon.  From a 
policy perspective this suggests efforts to improve risk management strategies should play a 
larger role in poverty reduction policies.  Specifically, promotion of credit structures that can 
better be used for consumption smoothing (longer term loans that are not self-amortizing or 
have more flexible repayment schedules) and microinsurance, both of which would reduce 
vulnerability, should be more thoroughly integrated into credit expansion programs, 
particularly microfinance.    






How Representative Are the ACP Data? 
1. Introduction  
One relevant question that arises from the analysis of enterprise choice and credit use 
amongst the Lima microentrepreneurs is the extent to which the results translate to a larger 
sample.  To what degree is the behavior exhibited by the entrepreneurs in the Peruvian 
sample found in the general population of urban microentrepreneurs?  To answer this, a 
representative sample of urban microentrepreneurs is needed.  While no such survey exists 
for Peru or Lima, a representative survey does exist for Ecuador, a country that is very 
similar to Peru geographically, economically, and culturally.  The cross-sectional survey of 
Ecuadorian urban microentrepreneurs was conducted under the SALTO Ecuador97 project 
from March to August 2004, and contains 17,738 microentrepreneurs, an estimated 3.8% of 
all urban microentrepreneurs in the country.  It is one of the few representative samples of 
urban microentrepreneurs in the developing world and provides invaluable information about 
the characteristics of the microenterprise sector, particularly within Latin America.  Since the 
universe of urban microentrepreneurs in Peru likely differs from that in Ecuador, the SALTO 
data cannot exactly place the ACP sample sits within a broader context.  Given the 
representative nature of the SALTO data, however, the analysis is useful in assessing if the 
behavior the ACP entrepreneurs is mimicked in a wider sample, and therefore if the analysis 
in the first two chapters has relevance for the general microenterprise sector.   
To situate the ACP entrepreneurs I compare them to the larger, representative 
Ecuadorian sample and to the subsample of 4,908 entrepreneurs that live in Quito and 
Quayaquil.  The Quito-Guayaquil sub-sample is constructed to address concerns that 
                                                 
97See www.salto-ecuador.com for the data, documentation, and details of the survey  
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entrepreneurs in small and medium sized towns (the cut off for “urban” is a population of 
over 5000) are unrepresentative of entrepreneurs in cities of over a million inhabitants, such 
as Lima.  Both cities are used in the “large city” comparison sample because they collectively 
have many of the characteristics of Lima, the capital, largest city, and economic center of 
Peru.  Neither Quito nor Guayaquil can claim all three titles; Guayaquil is the largest city, 
Quito is the capital, and economic power is almost evenly divided between the two98.  
General country and city level information is presented in table IV.1.       
The comparisons of the ACP and the Ecuadorian samples proceed in two steps.  The 
first step, outlined in Section 2, compares household and enterprise characteristics, as well as 
skill and vulnerability measures.  The second step, outlined in Section 3, examines formal 
credit use in the Ecuadorian sample and compares this to observed behavior in the ACP data.  
The main goal of the SALTO project was to gain a better understanding of access to and use 
of formal financial services by the microenterprise sector and potential barriers to each.  The 
numerous survey questions aimed at microentrepreneurs use of and demand for formal 
financial services provide a good picture of their formal, financial lives. 
2. Observable Household and Enterprise Characteristics  
This section walks through comparisons of key household and enterprise characteristics 
across the ACP and SALTO-Ecuador samples.  These characteristics include income and 
wealth, other household characteristics, enterprise characteristics and vulnerability and skill.  
Mean and, in some cases, median values are presented in table IV.2.      
2.1 Incomes and Wealth  
                                                 
98Quito is in the Andes while Quayaquil is on the coast.  The history of Ecuador is marked by continual conflict 
between the coastal and Andean regions over economic and political power, and this division explains why, 
dissimilar to many Latin America countries, one city is not dominant.      
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Comparisons of monthly household income reveal that the ACP sample is better off than the 
average, urban microentrepreneur in Ecuador.  Mean monthly income from all sources, 
including microenterprises, wage labor, remittances and other, is 45% higher for the ACP 
sample than for the total Ecuadorian sample.  The median, which better controls for outliers, 
is 88% higher, and fits into the upper quartile of the distribution of Ecuadorian income data.  
Results for monthly microenterprise income present even greater differences.  Mean 
microenterprise income is 79% higher in the ACP sample.  Median microenterprise income is 
113% higher and fits into the third quartile of the distribution in the Ecuadorian data.  Both 
comparisons are essentially the same for the Quito-Guayaquil subsample.  To the extent the 
Ecuadorian sample is representative of Peruvian microentrepreneurs, these results suggest the 
ACP entrepreneurs are better off and generate higher income from their businesses than the 
average, urban microentrepreneur.    
Unfortunately it is not possible to complement the income analysis with a comparison 
of wealth as the Ecuadorian survey does not contain wealth information.  Households were 
asked if they owned vehicles, equipment, machinery and other assets that could be used as 
loan collateral, but gross or net values were not acquired.  Incidence alone of “collateral-
worthy” assets suggests the ACP sample is better off.  46% of the Ecuadorian sample reports 
owning a vehicle, equipment, machinery, or other “collateral-worthy” assets, as opposed to 
100% of the ACP sample.  These comparisons are purely suggestive, however, since it is 
unclear if the asset questions in the Ecuadorian data include smaller durable goods, such as 
electrical appliances, listed by many of the ACP households.  Meanwhile, although 
comparison of enterprise level assets makes the Ecuadorian sample look better off, the survey 
questions differ across the samples and are not fully comparable.  In particular, the 
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Ecuadorian survey attempts to gauge the value of assets which were not included in the ACP 
questionnaire, such as vehicles, land, installations and inventory.  Although I remove land 
and inventory from the Ecuador asset values, the other categories are broad and likely 
include fixed assets which are not listed by the ACP entrepreneurs.        
 One important extension is a comparison of the Never Join group (the group that 
never has microfinance in the ACP data) to the Ecuadorian sample.  The Never Join group 
stands out from the entrepreneurs with microfinance and for the purposes of understanding 
low credit use, it is instructive to see if this group better reflects the average urban 
microentrepreneur than ACP entrepreneurs with microfinance credit.  Simple income 
comparisons imply this is the case, as the differences in monthly collapse when only 
considering the Never Join group.  Mean total income is only 17% higher for the Never Join 
group and median income is 44% higher.  Meanwhile, mean microenterprise income is 
actually slightly lower for the Never Join group, while median values are slightly higher.  
This suggests the Never Join group may be closer to the broad universe of urban 
microentrepreneurs than their counterparts with microfinance.   
2.2 Other Household Characteristics  
Other household characteristics include the age and gender of the entrepreneur and the 
dependency ratio99.  The gender breakdown differs across the two samples, reflecting the fact 
that while ACP/Mibanco lends to men, women remain a targeted group of the institution.  
Over 60% of the ACP sample is comprised of female entrepreneurs, as opposed to 46-47% of 
                                                 
99In the Ecuador data the dependency ratio is calculated as the number of children less than or equal to 12 as a 
percentage of total household members.  The ACP values presented previously, which were based on number of 
children less than 16, were adjusted in table IV.2 for comparability.  Total working members of the household, 
considered in the ACP analysis, is not available in the Ecuador sample.     
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the Ecuadorian sample.  Meanwhile, the age composition and the dependency ratios of the 
two samples are the same.      
2.3 Enterprise Characteristics  
The types of enterprises operated by households, as evidenced by the distribution across nine 
categories, is similar across the two samples.  For both samples the majority of enterprises 
are in the retail and wholesale category; 63% in the ACP sample and 55% in the Ecuadorian 
sample.  The most notable differences are that the food and clothing production and 
hospitality categories constitute larger portions of enterprises in the Ecuadorian sample.  
Overall, however, the distributions look similar and illustrate that the ACP sample, small as it 
is, probably represents well the types of enterprises found in the sector.      
While the categories of enterprises do not differ significantly, the number of 
enterprises operated by a household and monthly enterprise sales do.  The values for both are 
significantly higher for the ACP sample, suggesting these households are more 
“entrepreneurial” than the average.  For enterprise number, the average number for ACP 
households is 1.5, as opposed to 1.2 for Ecuadorian households.  Furthermore, only 59% of 
the households in the ACP data operate only one enterprise, as compared to 80% of 
households in the Ecuadorian data.  Increased entrepreneurial activity also is evidenced by 
enterprise sales, whose values in the ACP data dwarf those in the Ecuador data.  Mean and 
median month sales for the ACP sample are over 400% higher, and mean and median values 
of the Never Join group are almost 300% higher than those in the Ecuadorian sample.  These 
results further suggest the ACP households are better off than the average, urban 
microentrepreneur.             
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One interesting result is that despite higher enterprise sales, the incidence of 
informality is approximately the same in the ACP and Ecuador samples.  64% of the 
enterprises in the ACP data are informal, as opposed to 61% of the enterprises in the total 
Ecuadorian sample and 70% of enterprises in the Quito-Guayaquil sample.  The high degree 
of informality could be the result of similar difficulties in legalizing enterprises100, 
documented compellingly by DeSoto in the case of Peru (1989).           
2.4 Vulnerability and Skill 
To compare vulnerability and skill I use the variables outlined in the first two chapters.    
Vulnerability:  Vulnerability is defined as the inability to smooth consumption across 
negative income shocks and, in the absence of a direct measure, is captured by indirect 
measures of internal funds and access to consumption credit, including savings, the net value 
of durables and vehicles, home ownership, marital status and Time lived in the city of 
residence.  Of these, only savings incidence, home ownership and marital status are directly 
comparable across the samples, as time in city of residence and net household wealth are not 
available in the Ecuador sample. 
For savings, either formal or informal, incidence is the roughly the same across both 
samples.  While total savings looks larger for the ACP data, the top line number has to be 
adjusted because it includes cash stashed at home, which is excluded from the Ecuadorian 
survey.  This omission is critical because cash at home proves the most important savings 
vehicle for ACP households (almost 60% of respondents report that some of the savings 
takes this form), and the same is likely true of Ecuadorian households.  Comparisons of the 
                                                 




non-cash savings measure show no difference.  34% of the ACP sample has savings, as 
opposed to 36% of the total Ecuadorian sample and 31% of the Quito-Guayaquil sample.   
Property wealth as measured by home ownership is more prevalent amongst the ACP 
sample.  79% of the ACP sample has title to their home in 1997, as compared to 51% of the 
total Ecuadorian sample and 50% of the Quito-Guayaquil sample.  It is possible the high 
incidence of home title in the ACP data is a result of the massive urban titling program put in 
place in Peru starting in 1992.  Over a period of approximately 10 years this program gave 
title to over 1.2 million households101.  A similar project has not been launched in Ecuador.     
Finally, marital status, which proved the strongest predictor of microfinance 
participation, is equivalent across the two samples.  78% of the ACP sample in 1997 is 
married or has a partner, as compared to 76% of the total Ecuadorian sample and 77% of the 
Quito and Guayaquil subsample.  Unfortunately, similar to the ACP data, the Ecuadorian 
data do not give more information on the extent and quality of social networks, the most 
important source of consumption credit in times of need.  As such marital status remains the 
only variable we can use to capture the extent of informal networks.   
Based on these three vulnerability measures alone the ACP sample looks no more or 
less vulnerable than the average, urban microentrepreneur in Ecuador.  Responses on credit 
use, however, suggest that the ACP households are less vulnerable.  The use of informal and 
formal credit is significantly higher in the ACP sample, as is detailed in the next section.  
Higher credit use is even seen in the Never Join group in the ACP sample.  If any of the 
multiple credit sources listed by ACP household can be used to smooth consumption, higher 
credit incidence implies ACP households are less vulnerable.   
                                                 
101See Field (2003) for more details on the titling program in Peru   
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Finally, similar to the ACP survey, the Ecuadorian survey includes questions on 
mechanisms for managing adverse shocks at the household and enterprise level.  Responses 
are included in the second half of table IV.3.  In line with the ACP data, borrowing from 
family and friends and savings are among the most important mechanisms.  Dissimilar to the 
Peruvian entrepreneurs, however, loans from family and friends trump all other sources.  
Over 50% of Ecuadorian households report loans from family and friends as the main 
mechanism for managing a household emergency, as opposed to 18% of ACP households.  
The tremendous dependence on family and friends further illustrates the importance of 
informal networks in determining vulnerability.  It also illustrates the need to obtain more 
detail on the quantity and quality of informal ties to create more robust measures of 
vulnerability.         
Skill:  To measure skill I used education and experience.  For education, the average 
level is lower in the Ecuadorian sample than in the ACP sample.  Only 53% of the 
Ecuadorian sample (full and Quito-Guayaquil) has education above the primary level, as 
opposed to 68% of the ACP sample.  This may reflect the fact that the ACP households are 
better off, on average, than the typical, urban microentrepreneur in Ecuador.  Experience, in 
terms of years in entrepreneurship, is higher amongst the Ecuadorian sample.  Since we don’t 
know which measure dominates, on the surface it appears skill is the same.   
2.5 Conclusions about Comparability  
Simple comparisons suggest that ACP entrepreneurs are better off, generate higher 
microenterprise income, and are slightly more entrepreneurial than the average 
microentrepreneur.  If the ACP group is better off than the average, urban microenterpreneur, 
vulnerability may have substantial, relevance for the general microenterprise sector.         
 85
 
3. Formal Credit Use  
The SALTO Ecuador survey is extremely useful in understanding formal credit use because 
it was designed with the purpose of understanding access to and use of financial services by 
microentrepreneurs sector and the barriers to each.  As such, it provides a valuable aid in 
assessing if demand factors drive some portion of low credit use.  Selected information from 
the Ecuador survey questions are shown in table IV.3.  Information on the ACP sample is 
provided when the questions are comparable.    
The numerous survey questions from the SALTO project reveal that formal credit use 
amongst urban microentrepreneurs is incredibly low.  In the total sample only 7.2% of 
entrepreneurs used formal credit to start their enterprises and only 2.5% use formal finance 
for on-going operations.  The numbers are no better for the Quito-Guayaquil sample; 5.7% of 
entrepreneurs used formal credit for start-up and 2.9% use formal credit for on-going 
operations.  These low percentages do not fully stem from lack of collateral.  Only 36% of 
households with collateral in the form of home, land or vehicle ownership, have ever had a 
formal loan and only 20% have applied for a formal loan in the past 12 months.   
The survey also highlights that not all households who use formal credit are repeat 
borrowers.  Of the 5,151 households that have ever had a formal loan, 44% have not applied 
for one in the past 12 months.  Fear of overindebtedness and lack of need are cited as the 
main reasons.  This shows that formal credit use is by no means permanent and that dropout 
behavior is not a specific phenomenon of microfinance institutions.   
The lack of credit use is complemented by tremendous dependence on self-finance.  
68% of entrepreneurs list savings as the main source of funds for start-up and 90% list 
retained earnings as the principal financing source for on-going operations.  Savings is the 
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second most cited source of on-going finance.  In general these entrepreneurs don’t rely on 
any type of external finance, formal or informal.  This is a substantial departure from the 
credit histories displayed by the ACP entrepreneurs, where 12% report using formal credit 
other than microfinance, and 44% report supplier credit.  Including microfinance, almost 
61% of ACP households in 1997 have formal credit.  This compares with 2.5% of the 
Ecuadorian sample that reports formal credit and 5.6% that reports supplier credit.  While 
lower use in the Ecuador sample could result from more limited access, the numbers are so 
dramatically dissimilar that they suggest behavioral differences may be part of the 
explanation.  In particular, the limited dependence on supplier credit is surprising given the 
large reliance on this in the ACP data.  Differential use may be an indication that ACP 
enterprises are better established, despite lower tenure, and therefore have developed 
relationships with suppliers.       
Low leverage may be a determinant of stagnation in microenterprises, in which case 
higher credit use may explain why ACP enterprises appear to generate higher sales and 
income than the average Ecuadorian microenterprise.  Addressing the reliance on internal 
funds, the authors of the Ecuador survey comment:   
“The problem is that relying only on internally generated funds limits a firm’s ability 
to grow.  Ecuadorian microenterprises, in general, do not generate large cash flows, 
and profitability, especially in absolute terms, is relatively low.  This shortage of cash 
leads to financial problems.  Expanding the business often requires more capital than 
they can generate internally, yet the low levels of income and profitability limit their 
ability to service high-cost loans.” (Magill and Meyer 2005)  
 
Increasing reliance on external funds therefore may be pivotal to generating growth in the 
microenterprise sector.  Behavior of some entrepreneurs suggests, however, that demand 
factors are an important driver of low levels of leverage.  For example, there are 2,362 
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households that had a formal loan at one point, but have not applied for one in the past 12 
months.  When asked why, the most cited reason was fear of becoming indebted (33%), 
followed by no need for credit (19%).  Furthermore, 39% of households with collateral in the 
form of home, land, vehicles or equipment report no interest in borrowing any amount at an 
interest rate of 20%, a rate lower than those charged by most MFIs in Ecuador.  These 
responses and conversations with focus groups in Quito and Guayayuil led the survey authors 
to comment that “many microentrepreneurs only borrow when they really need it- when 
circumstances force them to take on a debt obligation.”  They subsequently conclude that 
“perhaps the most important challenge to MFIs in Ecuador is to overcome the 
microentrepreneurs’ resistance to using credit.” (Magill and Meyer 2005)          
Finally, there is some evidence of negative relationships between credit use and 
several of the vulnerability measures in the Ecuadorian data.  Of the entrepreneurs who have 
ever had a formal loan, 82% are married or have a partner, 66% have savings, and 62% own 
their home.  This compares with marital incidence of 74%, savings incidence of 25%, and 
home ownership incidence of 44% for entrepreneurs who have never had formal credit.  For 
all three measures the differences across entrepreneurs who have or have not used formal 
credit are significant at the 1% level.  These comparisons by no means show causality 
between vulnerability and credit use, but they suggest a relationship may exist. 
Overall the representative Ecuadorian data provides a more comprehensive picture of 
the low use of formal credit, showing that low penetration is not simply the domain of 
microfinance institutions, but of all types of formal lenders.  More compelling than this, 
however, is the strong evidence that muted demand partially drives these results.  The 
number of entrepreneurs who say they have no interest in formal credit because they are 
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afraid of over-indebtedness is large and challenges the notion that credit constraints are the 
main barrier to improved productivity of microenterprises.  While I do not test if 
vulnerability is linked to non-participation behavior in the Ecuadorian data, simple 
correlations with the vulnerability measures suggest it may play a role.   
4. Conclusion 
On the majority of household and enterprise characteristics, the ACP sample does not differ 
dramatically from the average, urban microentrepreneur in the SALTO-Ecuador data.  The 
average Ecuadorian microentrepreneur is married and about 40 years old, has a secondary 
education, various years of experience in microentrepreneurship, and operates an enterprise 
in the retail sector.  This entrepreneur depends heavily on family and friends in times of need 
and has limited reliance on external finance, either formal or informal.  The average ACP 
entrepreneur, in contrast, is slightly better off and uses substantially more external finance at 
the enterprise level, especially supplier credit.           
Going forward I plan to investigate the determinants of enterprise choice and formal 
credit use in the Ecuadorian data.  In the case of enterprise choice the analysis is limited due 
to the cross-sectional nature of the SALTO-Ecuador project, but nevertheless possible thanks 
to a line of questions in the survey on the variability of sales.  For the portion of 
entrepreneurs that report variable sales the questions allow for construction of expected sales 
and variance of sales, two of the proxy measures of the portion of resources dedicated to the 
risky enterprise (θ).  In the case of credit use, one important path of research is exploring the 
determinants of limited demand for formal credit exhibited by many of the Ecuadorian 
entrepreneurs.  Given that limited demand explains a portion of low credit use, explicating 
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some of the causes of debt aversion is critical to better understanding the role credit can 





Table II.2:  Summary Statistics   
Mean Values  1997 Values102  1999 Values 
Enterprise Characteristics, household level    
Average number of enterprises per HH  1.53 1.52 
Informality    
   All enterprises are informal 26.5% 33.8% 
   At least one enterprise is informal  48.4% 54.6% 
Household Characteristics    
Hit by Shock in past two years 44.4% 57.1% 
Age of Respondent  41.7 years 43.1 years 
% Respondents that are women 60.8% 60.1% 
Working Members of HH  3.36 3.40 
Dependency Ratio  0.30 0.27 
   
Vulnerability Measures    
Net Household Assets  8,996.7 Soles 9,416.7 soles 
Have Savings  55.8% 46.9% 
Own Home 80.8% 81.5% 
HH has Other Property  13.5% 14.9% 
Respondent married or equivalent 79.8% 76.7% 
Time in Lima  28.4 years 30.4 years 
   
Skill Measures   
Education of entrepreneur (% in each category)   
 Primary & Below (left out group) 32.2% 30.0% 
 Secondary  48.3% 51.5% 
 More Than Secondary  19.5% 18.5% 
Experience (max years of any enterprise) 8.06 years 9.50 years 
Observations (N households)  520 520 
Enterprise Characteristics, enterprise level    
Monthly Sales 3,861.5 soles 3,375.2 soles 
Estimated Annual Sales 44,257.1 soles 41,773.4 soles 
Time in operation  6.47 years 7.53 years 
Net Enterprise Assets (by enterprise)   4,873.1 soles 6,325.0 soles 
Total Enterprise Investment  2,593.0 soles 1,986.6 soles 
Total employees per enterprise103   1.87 1.32 
% enterprises with employees (not including 
entrepreneur)  
72.3% 48.0% 
Business Categories (% total enterprises)    
   Food and Clothing  5.5% 6.7% 
   Manufacturing 3.9% 4.1% 
   Construction 2.2% 1.8% 
   Auto Repair/ Auto Parts Sales 5.2% 2.2% 
   Minor Retail and Wholesale 62.5% 60.5% 
   Hospitality 6.7% 7.5% 
   Transport 7.3% 9.9% 
   Services 4.5% 4.7% 
   Other 2.3% 2.5% 
   
Enterprises in Sample (N) 786 759 
 
                                                 
102 1997 values inflated to 1999 prices.  For 1997 and 1999, 3.36 soles= 1USD (Banco Central de Reserva del 
Peru) 
103 Employees do not include the entrepreneur.  Workers=Employees + Entrepreneur 
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Table II.3: Other Summary Statistics      
Mean Value 1997 Values104  1999 Values 
Income and Consumption   
Total Income 22.777.1 soles 22,775.4 soles 
Total Microenterprise Income 13,310.6 soles 14,620.6 soles 
   Percent of Total 64.5% 65.4% 
Income Per Adult Equivalent  5,731.1 soles 5,745.0 soles 
Microenterprise income per adult equivalent 3,934.5 soles 3,809.1 soles 
Essential Consumption per Adult Equivalent  4,702.6 soles 4,879.4 soles 




Table II.4: Proxy Measures for θ  
 Mean Median 
Total Microenterprise Income    
Average Microenterprise Income 14,647.1 11,224.8 
Standard Deviation of Microenterprise Income  5,218.5 2,511.4 
Coefficient of Variation*100 34.8 28.2 
Observations (N) 514 514 
   
Sales, Primary Enterprise    
Monthly Sales of Primary Enterprise, 1997 4,944.3 1,981.5 
Monthly Sales of Primary Enterprise, 1999 4,574.8 1,820.0 
Average Monthly Sales of Primary Enterprise 4,602.1 2,183.3 
Standard Deviation of Monthly Sales   1,953.1 554.8 
Coefficient of Variation*100  32.7 29.4 
Observations (N) 418 418 
























                                                 
104 1997 values are inflated to 1999 prices. For 1997 and 1999 values 3.36 soles= 1USD (source, Banco Central 
de Reserva del Peru)  
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Table II.5:  Results of OLS Estimation of Microenterprise Income  





Standard Deviation of 
Microenterprise Income 
Values of Regressors:  1997 1999 1997 1999 1997 1999 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  
Vulnerability        





























































































































HH & Enterprise 
Controls105  
      


























Constant 9456.9 6703.7 9662.2 4094.8 3422.9 4872.9 
N 477 479 480 482 477 479 
Adjusted R2 0.179 0.190 0.090 0.188 0.066 0.066 
 Absolute value of t statistics in brackets    *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
                                                 
105 Other controls include gender, age as captured by three dummy variables (less than 25, between 40 and 60 
and above 60), dependency ratio, whether or not a household was hit with a negative shock in the past two 
years, the number of enterprises (significant at 5%), the informality status of enterprises, and dummy variables 
for the type of enterprise across 8 categories 
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Table II.6: Results of OLS Estimation of Primary Enterprise Sales   
Dependent Variable=  Mean Monthly Sales Standard Deviation of 
Monthly Sales 
Values of Regressors:  1997 1999  1997  1999  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 



























































Skill     

























HH & Enterprise Controls106      




















     
Constant  6636.7 1305.6 3669.3 740.3 
N 412 413 412 413 
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.058 0.036 0.034 
 Absolute value of t statistics in brackets    *significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
                                                 
106 Other controls include: age as captured by three dummy variables (less than 25, between 40 and 60 and 
above 60), dependency ratio, whether or not a household was hit with a negative shock in the past two years, the 
number of working household members, the number of enterprises (significant at 5%), the informality status of 
enterprises, and dummy variables for the type of enterprise across 8 categories 
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Table II.7: θ Measures for Groups Based on Microfinance Status   
(mean values reported)  Still Have Dropout Join MFI Never Join ANOVA  
p- value 
Microenterprise Income       
Microenterprise Income 
1997 
17,579.9 16,221.9 12,641.0 10.344.0 0.000*** 
Microenterprise Income 
1999 
18,216.1 13,145.4 15.975.2 9,705.9 0.002*** 
Average  Microenterprise 
Income  
17,920.1 14,683.7 14,308.1 10.046.5 0.000*** 
Standard Deviation of 
Microenterprise Income  
6,523.1 5,527.0 4,538.5 3,443.3 0.004*** 
N  216 87 63 149 515 
Primary Enterprise       
Monthly Sales 1997107  5764.3 6307.0 6046.3 3533.9 0.237 
Monthly Sales 1999 4855.2 4245.6 5050.6 2268.2 0.038** 
Mean Monthly Sales 5309.4 5312.5 5548.4 2901.0 0.045** 
Standard Deviation of 
Monthly Sales 
1925.5 2741.4 2696.6 1351.7 0.227 
N 183 55 52 128 418 
*difference significant at 10% level; **difference significant at 5% level; ***difference significant at 1% level 
 
   
 
Table II.8: Tests for the Equality of Distributions of θ Measures 
Comparison Group θ Measure Test  P-value of test 
statistic 
Microenterprise Income 
Still Have vs. Never Join  Average 
Microenterprise Income 
t-test for equality of means  0.000*** 
Still Have vs. Never Join Standard Deviation of 
Microenterprise Income 
t-test for equality of means 0.000*** 
Still Have vs. Never Join  Average 
Microenterprise Income 
Kolmogorov Smirnov test for 
equality of distributions  
0.000*** 
Still Have vs. Never Join Standard Deviation of 
Microenterprise Income 
Kolmogorov Smirnov test for 
equality of distributions 
0.000*** 
    
Monthly Sales of Primary Enterprise   
Still Have vs. Never Join Average Monthly Sales t-test for equality of means 
  
0.008*** 
Still Have vs. Never Join Standard Deviation 
Monthly Sales 
t-test for equality of means 0.250 
Still Have vs. Never Join Average Monthly Sales Kolmogorov Smirnov test for 
equality of distributions  
0.000*** 
Still Have vs. Never Join Standard Deviation 
Monthly Sales 
Kolmogorov Smirnov test for 
equality of distributions 
0.000*** 
    
***Can reject null of equality at 1% level
                                                 
107 Adjusted to 1999 soles  
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Table III.1: Types of Credit Other than Microfinance, 1997   
Use of Other Types of Credit 




in 1997  







Family/Friend 8.9% 10.1%  500 
Moneylenders 2.3% 5.8%  225 
Pawnshop 0.6% 0.4%  200 
Suppliers 54.1% 50.0%  200 
Companies/Credit Unions 2.0% 1.4%  715 
Banks 7.2% 3.3%  2,171 
EDPYMEs108  1.1% 0.4%  700 
Cooperatives 0.3% 0.7%  2,000 
ROSCAs 6.3% 4.7%  200 
Government  1.7% 1.8%  115 
Construction Banks 7.2% 2.5%  2,510 
Other 4.9% 5.1%  364 
None 33.5% 39.1%   
ACP (for 1997 borrowers)    1,300 
     
N respondents109  349 276   
% non-respondents  13.0% 8.0%   
Average # non MFI debt sources 0.97 0.86   
Mean debt outstanding, non ACP 1.229.7 698.9   
     
Use of Other Types of Credit (% 
Balanced Sample respondents) 
Still Have Dropout Join MFI Never Join 
Family/Friend 10.3% 8.6% 10.3% 11.8% 
Moneylenders 1.5% 5.7% 3.4% 5.1% 
Pawnshop 0.5% 1.4% 0.0% 0.7% 
Suppliers 49.0% 42.9% 48.3% 44.1% 
Companies/Credit Unions 2.1% 2.8% 1.7% 1.5% 
Banks 5.1% 8.6% 8.6% 0.0% 
EDPYMEs 1.0% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Cooperatives 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 
ROSCAs 3.1% 7.1% 8.6% 2.2% 
Government  0.5% 0.0% 3.4% 0.7% 
Construction Banks 6.2% 11.4% 6.9% 1.5% 
Other 4.6% 5.7% 1.7% 5.1% 
None 34.0% 34.2% 34.5% 39.0% 
     
N respondents110  194 70 58 136 
% non-respondent 34.0% 34.3% 34.5% 39.0% 
Average # non MFI debt sources 0.94 1.07 1.07 0.82 
Mean debt outstanding, non ACP  1030.5 1269.0 1242.3 501.1 
Mean debt outstanding ACP (1997 
soles)  
1,680.0  1,191.4   
  
 
                                                 
108 Entidades de Desarrollo para la Pequena y Microempresa.  These are MFIs that are regulated financial 
institutions, unlike most NGOs that are unregulated.    
109 79 HHs do not respond to these questions in the 1997 survey.  I leave them as non-responses 
110 62 HHs in balanced sample do not respond to these questions.  I leave them as non-responses 
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 Table III.2: Summary Statistics, Full Sample 1997 








Household Characteristics    
Total Income  24,667 16,180 0.000** 
% Entrepreneurs that are women 62.2% 59.8% 0.001** 
Age of Microentrepreneur (mean) 
Age Distribution 
   Less than or equal 25 
   Between 25 and 40 
   Between 40 and 60 


















         0.118 
Dependency Ratio  30.4% 29.6% 0.642 
# Working Members of HH 3.29 2.78 0.000** 
Hit by Shock in past two years 48.2% 39.2% 0.017* 
    
Enterprise Characteristics 
 
   
Enterprise Number  1.60 1.37 0.000** 
Informality 
   All enterprises informal 










Have Enterprise in Category    
   Food and Clothing  9.11% 5.78% 0.105 
   Manufacturing 4.8% 6.1% 0.450 
   Construction 3.8% 2.4% 0.296 
   Auto Repair/ Auto Parts Sales 6.6% 7.8% 0.531 
   Minor Retail and Wholesale 79.0% 80.6% 0.600 
   Hospitality111 11.1% 6.8% 0.052 
   Transport 13.9% 5.1% 0.001** 
   Services 6.6% 6.1% 0.807 
Employees & Capital    
Total employees, all enterprises  1.62 1.17 0.003** 
Employees per Enterprise  1.10 0.86 0.007** 
Net Enterprise Assets  9.187.1 3,983.6 0.000** 
    
Vulnerability    
Have Savings  62.2% 50.8% 0.002** 
Own Home  86.0% 70.0% 0.000** 
Other Properties  15.2% 10.6% 0.074 
Married or Equivalent 82.7% 71.8% 0.511 
Time in Lima  29.8 years 25.8 years 0.000** 
    
Wealth (net household assets) 11,121 6,840 0.000** 
    
Skill    
Education     
 Primary & Below 29.2% 36.2%  
 Secondary  49.3% 43.9% 0.157 
 More Than Secondary  21.5% 19.9% 0.614 
Experience (years in operation) 8.93 years 7.12 years 0.009** 
Observations (N) 400 301  
*Difference in means significant at the 5% level; ** Difference in means significant at the 1% level 
                                                 
111 ‘Hospitality’ includes hotels and restaurants.  This is predominantly some form of food service.    
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 Table III.3: Logit Estimation of 1997 Microfinance Status, Full Sample  
1997 Microfinance Status LOGIT LIN. PROB. MODEL 
Coef=average marginal effects (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) 





























































      









































Interaction Terms       








































Observations (N)  685 685 685 685 685 
Pseudo R2 .123 .132 .141 .130 0.132 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
                                                 
112 Other controls include whether or not entrepreneur is a woman, the entrepreneur’s age, the household’s dependency 
ratio, the number of working HH members, whether or not HH hit with a shock in the past 2 years (significant at 10%), 
the number of enterprises (significant at 5%), the informality status of enterprises, and dummy variables for the type of 
enterprise across 8 categories.   
113 In all cases redefining marital status more restrictively (cohabitation not included) slightly reduces the size of the 
coefficients, but all remain significant at the 10% level.   
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Table III.4: Summary Statistics, Household and Enterprise Characteristics, Balanced Panel 
Mean Values Still Have  Dropouts Join MFI Never Join ANOVA test  
(p value) 
Household Characteristics      
Entrepreneur a Woman 1997 58.7% 74.7% 55.6% 55.3% 0.019* 
Age Distribution 
    Less than 25 
    Between 25 and 40 
    Between 40 and 60 


























Dependency Ratio  
   1997 
















# Working Members of HH   
   1997 
















Hit by a Shock in past 2 years 
   1997 
















Enterprise Characteristics      
Enterprise Number  
   1997 
















All Enterprises Informal  
   1997 
















Have Enterprise in Category      
   Food and Clothing 
      1997 
















   Manufacturing 
      1997 
















   Construction 
      1997 
















   Auto, Other Repair & Parts 
      1997 
















   Minor Retail and Wholesale 
      1997 
















   Hospitality114 
      1997 
















   Transport 
      1997 
















   Services 
      1997 
















*Difference in means significant at the 5% level; **Difference in means significant at the 1% level 
                                                 
114 ‘Hospitality’ includes hotels and restaurants.  This is predominantly some form of food service.    
 99
 
Table III.5: Summary Statistics, Vulnerability and Skill Measures, Balanced Panel  
(values in 1997 nuevo soles)  Still Have Dropout Join MFI Never Join ANOVA  
p-value 
Vulnerability      
Have Savings  
   1997 
















Own Home  
   1997 
















Other Properties  
   1997 
















Married or Equivalent  
   1997 
















Time in Lima 1997  
 
30.2 years 30.4 years 26.2 years 25.5 years 0.001** 
Wealth (Net HH Assets)  
   1997 


















      
Skill      
Education 1997       
 Primary & Below 31.6% 25.3% 36.5% 35.3%  
 Secondary  47.7% 54.0% 42.9% 48.0% 0.590 
 More Than  
 Secondary  
20.7% 20.7% 20.6% 16.7% 0.784 
Experience 1997 (max years in 
operation of any enterprise) 
8.78 years 8.64 years 7.40 years 6.98 years 0.092 
      
Enterprise Resources      
Employees115       
Total employees all enterprises  
   1997 
















Employees per Enterprise  
   1997 
















% Enterprises with Employees 
   1997 











Capital      
Net Enterprise Assets  
   1997 
















Enterprise Investment  
   1997 
















*Difference in means significant at 5% level;**Difference in means significant at 1% level 
 
 
                                                 
115 Employees do not include the entrepreneur  
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 Table III.6: Logit Estimation of Microfinance Status, Balanced Panel   
1999 Microfinance Status 1999 Microfinance Status 1997 Microfinance Status 
(coef=avg. marginal effects) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Vulnerability Measures116        




























































       










Skill Measures       






































Interaction Terms       
Wealth*Home   -0.004 
(0.37) 
  -0.022 
(1.44) 
Wealth*Savings   -0.002 
(0.43) 
  0.001 
(0.11) 
Wealth*Married   -0.006 
(0.81) 
  -0.018 
(1.28) 
Wealth*TimeinLima   -0.000 
(1.00) 




  0.276 
(2.16)** 




  -0.086 
(0.99) 




  -0.043 
(0.42) 




  0.004 
(1.17) 
  -0.004 
(1.08) 
Observations (N)  468 468 468 466 466 466 
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.078 0.092 0.156 0.167 0.202 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
                                                 
116 Other controls include whether or not entrepreneur is a woman, the entrepreneur’s age, the household’s dependency 
ratio, whether or not HH hit with a shock in the past 2 years (significant at 10%), the number of enterprises (significant 
at 5%), whether or not all of the enterprises are informal (negative and significant at the 1% level in 1999, insignificant 
in 1997), and dummy variables for the type of enterprise across 8 categories.   
117 In all but column (1) defining marital status more restrictively (taking out cohabitation) slightly reduces the size of 
the marital status coefficients, but all remain significant at the 5% level.   
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Table III.7: Logit Estimation of Microfinance Status, Still Have vs. Never Join  
(Coef=avg. marginal 
effects 
1997 Variables 1999 Variables 
except interaction terms)  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Vulnerability Measures118        






























































       










Skill Measures       








































Interaction Terms       
Wealth*Home   -0.023 
(1.03) 
  0.005 
(0.30) 
Wealth*Savings   -0.005 
(0.27) 
  -0.008 
(0.62) 
Wealth*Married   -0.017 
(0.78) 
  -0.042 
(1.87)* 
Wealth*TimeinLima   -0.001 
(0.12) 




  0.136 
(0.89) 




  -0.160 
(1.30) 




  -0.064 
(0.32) 




  -0.006 
(1.17) 
  0.002 
(0.44) 
Observations (N)  331 329 329 331 331 331 
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.187 0.233 0.166 0.168 0.214 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
                                                 
118 Other controls include whether or not entrepreneur is a woman, the entrepreneur’s age, the household’s dependency 
ratio, the number of working age HH members, whether or not HH hit with a shock in the past 2 years (significant at 
10%), the number of enterprises (significant at 5%), whether or not all of the enterprises are informal (significant at 1% 
level in 1999, insignificant in 1997) and dummy variables for the type of enterprise across 8 categories.   
119 In all but column (5) redefining marital status slightly reduces the size of the marital status coefficients, but all 
remain significant at the 10% level.      
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Table III.8: Shocks, Incidence and Management  






Total ANOVA test 
(p value) 
Macroeconomic Indicators     
Real GDP      
   ∆Q3 1995- Q3 1997   8.72%  
   ∆Q3 1997- Q3 1999   -0.2%  
Internal Demand     
   ∆Q3 1995- Q3 1997   8.6%  
   ∆Q3 1997- Q3 1999   -6.4%  
Shock Incidence      
1997 Shocks     
Hit by Shock in past two years 49.7% 36.9% 44.4% 0.004** 
Most Severe Shock120  
   Robbery 
   Severe Illness 
   Loss or Reduction in Income 
   Death of Income Earner  

























1999 Shocks      
Hit by Shock in past two years 57.7% 56.6% 57.2% 0.757 
Most Severe Shock 
   Loss of Reduction of Income 
   Robbery 
   Severe Illness 
   Death of Income Earner  

























% Below Poverty Line121 
   1997 













Observations (N) 206 214 520  
Managing Negative Shocks122      
1997     
Use Savings 30.0% 28.0% 29.3%  
Borrow at all 








Observations (N) 193 118 311  
     
1999     
Use Savings 19.9% 21.7% 20.6%  
Borrow at all 








Observations (N)  176 120 296  
*Difference in means significant at the 5% level; **Difference in means significant at the 1% level.  
 
  
                                                 
120 Shock listed as most severe for those who reported being hit with a shock over the past two years.  
Distribution across most severe shock similar for full 1997 sample.  
121 Poverty line calculated by INEI (Peruvian statistical agency) using a $2/day measure.  Household 
classified as below the poverty line if consumption per adult equivalent falls below $2 day measure.      
122 Households who were hit with a shock were asked the primary way of managing the adverse event.    
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Table IV.1: Summary Statistics, Country and City Level  
 Country (as of 1997)123  City    







Population 11.9 million 24.4 million 7.4 million 1.5 million 1.9 million 
Urban population (% 
total) 
71.7% 60.3%    
GDP, current prices  $19.8 billion $63.8 billion    
GDP per capita $1,656 $2,619    
GDP growth 3.4% 7.2%    
Literacy Rate      
Life Expectancy 70.2 years 68.5 years    
Credit to private sector (% 
GDP) 
     
Domestic credit provided 
by banking sector (% 
GDP) 
36.9% 17.7%    
Deposit Interest Rate 28.1% 15.0%    
Inflation (consumer 
prices) 
30.6% 8.6%    
      
 
                                                 
123 Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank   
124 From the 2001 Census 
125 Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica (INEI), Estadisticas Vitales en Lima 
Metropolitana, 1999-2000   
126 Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INEC) 
127 www.visitaguayaquil.com (not available in INEC)  
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Table IV.2: Summary Statistics: Sample Comparison   
 Lima ACP128  SALTO Ecuador 
Mean values (median value in 
parentheses)  
ACP Full 
Sample 1997   
ACP Never Join 
group 1997 
Total Sample Quito and 
Guayaquil 
Household Characteristics     








Total Monthly Microenterprise 

















Household Assets: Own vehicle, 
equipment, machinery, other assets   
100% 100% 46.0%  48.6% 
Dwelling characteristics      
     Have Electricity  98.6% 97.3% 99.4% 99.5% 
     Have Sanitation  82.9% 80.0% 80.8% 79.2% 
     Water inside home 82.4% 79.3% 61.3% 61.8% 
Entrepreneur a woman  61.2% 55.3% 46.7% 46.3% 
Entrepreneur’s age   41.5 years 






(41 years)  
Dependency Ratio  22.9%  20.9% 25%   24% 
Vulnerability & Skill     
Entrepreneur Married  78.0% 71.3% 76.2% 76.6% 
Has title to home 79.0% 70.0% 51.3% 50.4% 
Savings (not including cash at home) 34.4% 31.0% 36.1% 30.6% 
Education     
     Secondary 46.9% 48.0% 41.4% 43.2% 
     Above Secondary  20.8% 16.7% 11.9% 9.8% 
Experience   8.1 years 




(7 years)  
10.4 years 
(7 years)  
Observations (Households) 701 150 17,559 4,908 
Enterprise Characteristics     
Enterprise Number 
















($104)   
Enterprise Assets (for one enterprise 






($20)   
$1,707.1 
($50)  
Enterprise informal   64.4% 66.5% 60.4%  71.3%  
Tenure 6.6 years 
(4 years) 
5.9 years 





Business Category     
Food and Clothing Production 5.2% 4.8% 11.0% 10.9% 
Manufacturing 3.7% 5.3% 7.1% 7.3% 
Construction 2.3% 1.9% 1.1% 1.5% 
Auto and Other Repairs 5.4% 8.6% 5.0% 5.0% 
Retail or Wholesale 62.9% 66.0% 54.6% 55.0% 
Hospitality 6.5% 5.3% 10.0% 9.7% 
Transportation 7.0% 2.4% 7.1% 7.0% 
Personal Services  4.4% 3.8% 4.0% 3.6% 
Other 2.5% 1.9% 0.01% 0.0% 
Observations (Enterprises) 1,047 209 17,559 4,908 
 
                                                 
1282.66 as conversion ratio to USD in Sept 1997 for Nuevo Soles  
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Table IV.3: Credit Use 
 Peru Ecuador 
 ACP Entrepreneurs   Total Sample Quito Guayaquil 
Formal Credit Use     
Do you know any formal lenders 






Have you ever had a formal loan?   30.8% 30.7% 
Have you applied for a loan in the 
past 12 months?  
 17.3%  17.3% 
Enterprise Financing    
Sources for start-up    
     Personal Savings  68.1% 68.9% 
     Family and Friends  27.1% 27.6% 
     Formal loan130  7.2% 5.7% 
     Moneylender  2.2% 2.1% 
Sources for on-going operations    
     Retained Earnings  90.9% 90.4% 
     Supplier credit  44.5% 5.6% 3.7% 
     Formal loan131 11.4% 2.5% 2.9% 
     Family and Friends 9.3% 2.5% 2.9% 
     Savings 




Observations  625 17,621 4,875 
Collateral     
Households that have collateral 





% with collateral that has ever had 
formal credit  
 36.0% 35.0% 
% with collateral that has applied 
for formal credit in the past 12 
months 
 20.1%  19.8% 
Credit Demand     
% of sample NOT interested in a 
loan at a 20% interest rate 
 38.5% 35.0% 
Of these, households that have 
collateral  
 70.0% 68.2% 
Shock Management    
Principal means of managing a 
negative shock (HH level)  
   
     Savings 29.3%  10.9% 11.2% 
     Loan From Family and Friends 18.0% 53.5% 51.9% 
     Loan From a Moneylender 2.6% 10.6% 9.9% 
     Loan from a formal lender 4.5% 12.2% 13.6% 
Observations 786 17,621 4,875 
 
  
                                                 
129This represents the number of households in the ACP sample who have heard of ACP/Mibanco  
130 Includes banks, cooperatives, financieras, and NGOs (MFIs included here)  
131 For Ecuador includes banks, cooperatives, financieras, and NGOs (MFIs included here).  For Peru 
formal lenders include these sources plus construction banks.    
132 The ACP questionnaire was meant to obtain information on sources of debt, and therefore retained 
Earnings and savings not listed as financing options for the enterprise.  However, 35.4% of the households 
that answered the debt questionnaire list “none” as sources of credit.  It is therefore likely these 
entrepreneurs rely purely on internal finance in the form of retained earnings.  
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Graph II.1: Breakdown of Enterprises by Category  
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Graph II.2: Tests of First Order Stochastic Dominance for θ Measures 
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Graph IV. 1: Enterprise Categories, Ecuador Sample   
Distribution of Enterprises Across Categories
Ecuador Full Sample
Production of Food and 
Clothing
11%



















Distribution of Enterprises Across Category 












Auto and Other Repairs, Parts 
5%
Manufacturing (non food or clothing 
production)
7%




Appendix 1: Nested Logit Estimation of Microfinance Selection 
For robustness I estimate microfinance selection in the balanced panel using a nested 
logit model.  I choose a nested logit over a simple non-nested multinomial logit model 
because the choices under consideration stem from a sequential decision process, making 
it highly probable the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption133 (IIA) is 
violated and that a multinomial logit yields inconsistent estimates.  The nested logit is 
more appropriate in this context because it allows for unobserved similarities between 
groups within a defined subset, or nest.  This is a valuable feature as it is likely 
entrepreneurs with microfinance in 1997 (Still Have and Dropout groups) have more in 
common with each other, regardless of their 1999 microfinance status, than with 
entrepreneurs without microfinance in 1997 (Never Join or Join MFI group).           
The nested logit model134 allows for unobserved similarities across certain groups by 
creating a hierarchical structure.  The choice set is divided into S mutually exclusive 
subsets, or nests, and the probability an entrepreneur belongs to a particular group is the 
probability she chooses a certain nest s over all other nests multiplied by the probability 
she chooses a specific group j from within nest s.  In the ACP data I divide the four 
groups into two nests.  The first nest contains the two groups with microfinance in 1997 
(the Still Have and Dropout groups) and the second nest contains the two groups without 
microfinance in 1997 (the Join MFI and Never Join groups).  Each nest thus contains one 
group with microfinance in 1999 and one group without microfinance in 1999.   
                                                 
133 This assumption states the relative probabilities of two choices are not impacted by the inclusion of 
another choice.  For example, the probability an entrepreneur is a ‘Still Have’ relative to the probability she 
is a ‘Never Join’ will not be impacted by the possibility she is a ‘Join MFI’.  It is likely this assumption 
holds.  I did run a MNL model and Small-Hsiao tests confirmed that in all cases the IIA assumption did not 
hold. 


















         
The probability an entrepreneur belongs to one of the four groups (Pjs) is the probability 
she selects microfinance prior to 1997 (probability of choosing nest s= Ps) multiplied by 
the probability she selects microfinance between 1997 and 1999 (probability of choosing 
a specific choice within a nest= Pj|s).  Estimating these marginal and conditional 
probabilities reveals the determinants of microfinance status in both periods.   
 The nested logit follows a random utility framework, such that the probability an 
entrepreneur falls into a specific group is the probability this group yields higher 
expected utility than every other group.  If utility from a given group j in nest s is a linear 
function of observable attributes that vary across nests (Zs), observable attributes that 
vary across groups (Xj|s), and unobservable factors ( ) (jsε jsssjjsi εξZβXU ++= ''| ) and if 
the unobservable utility components ( ) are distributed according to a generalized 
extreme value distribution (GEV)
jsε
135 it can be shown the probability an entrepreneur falls 
into a specific group (Pjs) can be written as:   
                                                 
135 Under this distribution the random components of choices within a specific nest are allowed to be 


























==    (2) 
Where  measures the degree of correlation of the error terms for the elements of set s.  
The inclusive value for set s, (I
sρ













The inclusive value is an index of the expected maximum utility from the choices in a 
particular set and captures the degree of complementarity amongst elements of a 
particular nest.  In order for a nested logit model to be consistent with utility 
maximization estimated inclusive values must lie within the unit interval136.  If inclusive 
value estimates lie outside this range, the nested logit likely is inappropriate over other 
models of multinomial choice.  
 I estimate the parameters of the nested logit model using a full information 
maximum likelihood model, as this yields consistent and efficient estimates137.  For 
observable factors that impact 1997 microfinance status (Zi) I use the same household 
and enterprise characteristics, vulnerability and skill measures as in the logit analysis.  
For factors that impact 1999 microfinance status (Xj|s) I use the variables outlined belo
Average values across groups are provided in table A.1.  
w.  




















         
Where ρ and (  measures the degree of correlation between the error terms of the two 
choices in the set.  McFadden (1981) shows the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption (IIA) 
holds within nests but not across nests under this distribution.  When ρs=1 the choices in the nest are 
independent and the nested logit collapses to the standard multinomial logit model.    
136 If the inclusive value for a nest equals 0 the model degenerates since no utility will come from any other 
nest.  Alternatively, if the inclusive values for nests equal 1 there is no complementarity amongst the 
elements in the nests and the nested structure is unnecessary.  In this case a multinomial logit model is 
more appropriate. 
137 Implicit is the assumption that in both periods households have the option of choosing microfinance.   
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1) Household characteristics (HCj|s) include: changes in the dependency ratio; changes in 
the number of working household members; whether or not the entrepreneur was hit with 
a shock in the past two years; and the age and gender of an entrepreneur as of 1997.   
2) Enterprise characteristics (ECj|s) include: changes in the number of enterprises; 
whether on not a household closed the primary enterprise between 1997 and 1999138; 
changes in the formality status of enterprises run by the household (if the household had 
more or less informal enterprises in 1999 than in 1997); and changes in the categories of 
enterprises run by the household139.  
3) Vulnerability Measures include: changes in net household assets, savings, home 
ownership, other property140, and marital status.  Also included is the entrepreneur’s 
tenure in Lima as of 1997.  
4) Skill Measures include: Education and experience, but since these variables do not 
extensively change over the two year period, I use 1997 values in the estimation.     
 Results of full maximum likelihood estimation of the nested logit model are 
presented in table A.2.  Coefficients in the top half of the table report the impact of the 
observables on the probability an entrepreneur does not have microfinance in 1997 
( =Upper Nest=2) over the probability an entrepreneur has microfinance in 
1997 (( =Upper Nest=1).  Coefficients in the bottom half report the impact of 
the observables on the probability an entrepreneur does not have microfinance in 1999 
)2( =siYP
)1( =siYP
                                                 
138 Households were asked if the enterprise they listed as primary in 1997 still exists in 1999.  “No’ 
responses were coded as primary business closure.  In many cases household opened new enterprises, so 
the net change in enterprises is zero or even positive.  
139 I create a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the categories of the businesses run by the 
household differ in 1999 relative to 1997.  For example, if in 1997 the household had one enterprise in the 
retail sector and one enterprise in the construction section and in 1999 the household had two enterprises in 
the retail sector, the household would have a value of 1 for this dummy variable.    
140 I also used 1999 levels of vulnerability measures, but results do not differ from those when changes are 
used.    
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over the probability an entrepreneur does.  The first column contains estimated impacts 
on the probability an entrepreneur is in the Dropout group over the Still Have group 
( ).  The second column contains estimated impacts on the probability an 
entrepreneur is in the Never Join group over the Join MFI join ( ).  All 
reported coefficients are average marginal effects.  
)2( 1| =jiYP
)4( 2| =jiYP
 The results are very similar to those from the simple logit model.  Estimation of the 
upper branches finds savings, home ownership and marital status are all significant in 
predicting microfinance status in 1997.  Savings decreases the probability an entrepreneur 
does not have microfinance in 1997 by 14.7%.  Home ownership decreases the 
probability by 25%, and martial status decreases the probability by 23.4%.  While net 
household assets are also found to significantly decrease the probability of falling into the 
no-microfinance in 1997 branch, the estimated marginal effect is zero, implying the 
importance of wealth is quite low.  Thus the nested logit finds that in 1997 lower 
vulnerability increases the probability an entrepreneur has microfinance.  
 For 1999 microfinance status, similar to the logit analysis, estimation of the lower 
branches finds less conclusive determinants of microfinance selection.  Within the first 
nest (Dropout vs. Still Have) a negative change in marital status, a positive change in the 
number of working household members, the closure of the primary enterprise, and an 
increase in the degree of informality are significant in distinguishing the Dropout group.  
In all cases positive values increase the probability an entrepreneur drops out of the 
microfinance program instead of staying.  For marital status, the significance of a 
negative change in determining dropout behavior supports the vulnerability hypothesis of 
the paper.  Entrepreneurs that become more vulnerable through the loss a spouse or 
 115
 
partner are more likely to leave microfinance programs.  This result is particularly 
compelling given that marital status is likely the strongest measure of vulnerability in the 
data and proves to be the most robust predictor of microfinance status in the logit 
analyses.        
Within the second nest only a positive change in marital status is significant in 
distinguishing the Join MFI and the Never Join groups.  Amongst entrepreneurs that do 
not have microfinance in 1997, those that marry or begin to cohabitate have a higher 
propensity of not joining microfinance programs by 1999.  These results are perplexing 
and go against the vulnerability hypothesis of this paper.  However, for this branch it is 
clear there is little variation across the two groups, making it difficult to determine the 
factors that drive one group to join microfinance programs.   
 Table A.2 also includes estimated inclusive values for each branch.  We can reject 
the hypothesis that the inclusive values equal 1, given the chi squared of the likelihood 
ratio test is over 200.  This finding confirms the existence of unobserved similarities 
between the groups within each nest, supporting the choice of a nested logit model over a 
multinomial logit model.  Inconsistent with utility maximization, the inclusive value for 
the Join MFI and Never Join branch is greater than 1.  However neither inclusive value is 
significantly different from zero.  This result could stem from the small sample size of 
each group and the lack of large variation between the groups within each nest.  Finally 
the bottom portion of Table A.1 presents percent correct predictions for each group.  The 
percentages show the nested logit does a good job of predicting the Still Have group, a 
decent job of predicting the Never Join groups, and a poor job of predicting the Dropout 
and Join MFI groups.  The lack of predictive power for the Dropout and Join MFI groups 
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may result from the small sample size of each group.  As a result there may simply be 
insufficient information to distinguish within each branch the group that takes out 
microfinance loans between 1997 and 1999 and the group that does not.    
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Table A.1: Additional Explanatory Variables for Lower Branch Estimation, Nested Logit (Xi|j)   
Mean Values Still Have Dropout Join MFI Never Join ANOVA  
p-value 
Vulnerability      
Change in net HH assets -50.1 soles 70.7 soles 180.8 soles 92.7 soles 0.096* 
Change in property (home 
ownership or other 
property)141  
     
   Positive  14.6% 12.6% 14.1% 17.3% 0.781 
   Negative  13.7% 14.9% 12.5% 11.3% 0.860 
Change in savings       
   Positive (now have) 18.3% 18.4% 19.0% 18.0% 0.998 
   Negative (no longer have) 31.8% 26.4% 14.3% 26.7% 0.054* 
Change in Marital Status      
     Positive 3.6% 4.6% 1.6% 7.3% 0.115 
     Negative 6.4% 11.5% 1.6% 8.7% 0.236 
      
Household Characteristics      
Entrepreneur a Woman 
(1997) 
58.7% 74.7% 55.6% 55.3% 0.019** 
Age of Entrepreneur (1997) 44.0 43.2 41.9 42.4 0.391 
Change in Dependency Ratio -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.965 
Change in Working HH 
members  
-0.51 -0.39 -0.19 -0.25 0.278 











Enterprise Characteristics      
Change in Formality Status 
     Positive 
















Change in Enterprise Number      
     Positive 21.5% 23.0% 14.1% 24.7% 0.384 
     Negative 21.5% 31.0% 25.0% 17.3% 0.097* 
Change in Composition of 
Enterprises (business 
categories)  
45.9% 56.4% 29.5% 42.6% 0.015** 
Close Primary Enterprise 
between 1997 and 1999 
14.6% 34.5% 18.8% 13.3% 0.002*** 
      
Predictive Power Nested 
Logit 
     
Observations in Nested Logit 
estimation  
203 78 61 138 480 
% correct percent predictions  76.8% 11.5% 6.5% 55.8%   
      
*Difference in means significant at 5% level **Difference in means significant at 1% level 
 
                                                 
141 I merged the home ownership and other property dummy variables, since the positive and negative  changes for each 
one are minimal.  Thus the property variable registers a positive change if either home ownership or other property 
changes in the positive or negative direction.  
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Table A.2: Nested Logit Estimation  
 
*significant at 10% level; **significant at 5% level; ***significant at 10% level
UPPER NEST= Microfinance Status in 
1997 (average marginal effects reported) 
Do Not Have Microfinance 1997 vs. Have 
1997 Microfinance 
Vulnerability Measures    
Own Home 1997 -0.250***  
Other Property 1997 -0.029  
Have  Savings 1997 -0.147**  
Married or Equivalent 1997 -0.234*  
Time in Lima 0.000  
Net HH Assets 1997 (Wealth) -0.000**  
   
Household & Enterprise Controls142    
Working Household Members 1997 0.000  
Hit with Shock in Past 2 years, 1997 -0.083**  
All Enterprises Informal 1997 0.010  
   
LOWER BRANCHES= Microfinance 
Status in 1999 
Dropout vs.            
Still Have 
Never Have vs.   
Join MFI 
Vulnerability Measures   
Change in Property Status (home & other) 
   Positive 







Change in Savings 
   Positive 







Change in Marital Status 
   Positive 







Time in Lima 1997 0.000 0.000 
Change in Net HH Assets (Wealth)  -0.000 -0.000 
   
Household & Enterprise Controls143    
Change in Working HH Members 0.000* 0.000 
Hit with Shock in Past 2 years, 1999 0.001 -0.027 
Change in Informality Status 
   Positive 







End Primary Enterprise from 1997 0.019** 0.000 
   
Inclusive Value Estimates (Is) 0.37 1.34 
Chi Squared  273.8  
Observations (N)   480  
                                                 
142 Other controls include age, as measured by bins, whether or not entrepreneur is a woman, the dependency ratio, 
business category dummy variables and skill as measured by dummy variables for secondary education, above 
secondary education, and experience.   
143 Other controls include age, whether or not entrepreneur is a woman, change in the dependency ratio, a change in the 
number of enterprises, and skill as measured by dummy variables for secondary education in 1997, above secondary 
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